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a b s t r a c t
I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using
data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise
behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock
option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These
findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and
remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic
agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts.
& 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Are optimistic CEOs paid differently? Bertrand and
Schoar (2003) and Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) show that
a significant fraction of the variation in corporate practices
and executive compensation can be explained by manager
fixed effects. The authors interpret these findings as
evidence that managerial “style” and latent individual
characteristics affect corporate policies, actions, and out-
comes. Two latent characteristics that are well documen-
ted in the psychology literature (see, e.g., Taylor and
Brown, 1988) and have received much attention in eco-
nomics and finance in the recent past are overconfidence
and optimism. A rapidly growing literature has provided
ample evidence for their impact on corporate behavior.1
Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013), for example, find
that financial executives are both overconfident and opti-
mistic, and that a firm's investment is increasing in both
biases. Landier and Thesmar (2009) show how entrepre-
neurial optimism affects the choice of debt maturity, and
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1 Explanations for corporate actions that are based on managerial
optimism or overconfidence, of course, go back at least as far as Roll's
(1986) hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. The distinction between
overconfidence and optimism, however, is sometimes blurred in the
literature. In this paper, an agent is considered optimistic if he believes
that good outcomes are more likely than they really are. An agent is
considered overconfident if he believes that information he possesses is
more precise than it really is.
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Malmendier and Tate (2005a,b, 2008) and Malmendier,
Tate, and Yan (2011) provide evidence that overconfident
CEOs display higher investment-cash flow sensitivities, are
more acquisitive, and are less likely to rely on equity
financing than their peers. Given these findings, a natural
question to ask is whether and how such biases in beliefs
are reflected in compensation arrangements and incentive
schemes: Are optimists paid differently? Do principals
design compensation contracts that take advantage of
the agents' optimism—and if so, how?
I address these questions by studying the effect of CEO
optimism on CEO compensation. I focus on CEOs because
their compensation contracts are more likely to be tailored
to their individual characteristics than the compensation
plans offered to rank-and-file employees. CEO compensa-
tion contracts thus provide a laboratory in which the
effects of optimism on contract design can be examined.2
I estimate the effect of optimism on compensation by
comparing the remuneration of CEOs who work for the
same firm but display different levels of optimism, con-
trolling for differences in the employment period as well
as time-varying firm and CEO characteristics. Following
this approach and using data on compensation in US firms,
I provide evidence that CEOs whose behavior is indicative
of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants,
fewer bonus payments, and lower total compensation than
their peers. These findings are consistent with the impli-
cations of a model in which an unbiased principal can
compensate an optimistic agent with fewer incentive
claims because an optimist overestimates the claims'
future payoffs.
I assess each CEO's optimism with two different mea-
sures. The first measure is based on the CEO's option
exercise decisions and follows the rationale proposed by
Malmendier and Tate (2005a,b, 2008) and Malmendier,
Tate, and Yan (2011). Exercises during the final year before
the options' expiration date—despite the fact that the
options were already deep in the money at the end of
the previous year—are classified as “late” and taken as an
indication for optimistic beliefs about the company's pro-
spects. The fraction of late option exercises is then used as
a proxy for the CEO's optimism. The second measure is
based on the earnings forecasts that are voluntarily
released by each firm. A forecast that exceeds the ex post
realized earnings or, alternatively, the analyst consensus
forecast, is classified as “optimistic.” The fraction of fore-
casts that are classified as optimistic is then used as a
proxy for the CEO's optimism. The rationale behind this
approach is that optimistic CEOs overestimate their firms'
future performance and should thus be more likely than
their peers to release inflated earnings forecasts.
The empirical findings presented in this paper are
robust to controlling for various CEO- and firm-level
characteristics, as well as firm and year fixed effects, and
are confirmed in multiple robustness tests. Furthermore,
I entertain several alternative explanations and show that
they are not sufficient to explain the results. In particular,
to address the concern that the CEOs are appointed based
on each firm's individual target level of optimism, I model
the preferred level of optimism for each firm as the sum of
two components: a time-invariant, unobservable base
level and a time-varying, linear combination of observable
firm characteristics. Controlling for this specification, I do
not find any evidence that the empirical findings are
explained by differences in firm characteristics, which
may be related to both the decision to employ an optimis-
tic CEO as well as to his compensation. Similarly, control-
ling for differences in firm performance and board
characteristics does not change the results. Neither do
I find any evidence that the late exercising of in-the-
money options can be explained by differences in the
CEOs' portfolios of company stock and options, inside
information, or procrastination.
Regarding the optimism measure based on the CEOs'
forecasting behavior, robustness tests based on analyst con-
sensus estimates confirm that the smaller option grants of
optimists are not merely the result of missing a given earnings
target. CEOs whose earnings forecasts systematically exceed
the contemporaneous analyst estimates receive lower-valued
option grants than their peers. Furthermore, controlling for
whether or not the realized earnings exceed two salient
benchmarks—the prior year's earnings and the analyst con-
sensus forecast—does not change the results. Neither do I find
any evidence for a sample selection bias due to the fact that
firms choose whether or not to release voluntary earnings per
share (EPS) forecasts.
Examining the compensation of CEOs whose earnings
forecasts are systematically too low—i.e., too pessimistic—
reveals that the results are not driven by the CEOs'
inability to produce accurate earnings estimates. Only the
CEOs who habitually overestimate their firms' future earn-
ings, i.e., the overly optimistic CEOs, receive fewer incen-
tives and lower total pay than their unbiased counterparts.
Pessimistic CEOs, to the contrary, are found to receive
larger option and restricted stock grants and more bonus
payments than their peers. This suggests that inaccurate
forecasts per se are not a sign of lower talent, which in
turn causes lower compensation. Moreover, controlling for
the confidence that the CEOs place in their own forecasts
as measured by the widths of the forecast ranges has no
material effect on the results.
Finally, I provide empirical evidence for a negative
association between the utilized measures of CEO opti-
mism and the fraction of incentives in the CEOs' total
compensation. If the systematic late exercising of in-the-
money options and the persistent issuing of inflated earn-
ings forecasts were not driven by optimism but instead by
a higher risk-tolerance of the CEOs, then one would expect
the opposite result (see, e.g., Bellemare and Shearer, 2010;
Grund and Sliwka, 2010; Dohmen and Falk, 2011, Graham,
Harvey, and Puri, 2013). The negative association between
the optimism measures and the percentage of incentives
in the CEOs' total compensation thus suggests that the
findings are not explained by a higher risk-tolerance of
the CEOs.
The paper contributes to the existing literature on
managerial biases and CEO compensation by providing
2 Whether and how employee optimismmay explain the provision of
broad-based option plans to employees below the top-management level
is examined, for example, by Oyer and Schaefer (2005) and Bergman and
Jenter (2007).
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empirical evidence that CEO optimism is reflected in CEO
compensation. CEOs whose option exercise behavior and
earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs
receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus pay-
ments, and less total compensation than their peers. These
results show how sophisticated principals can take advan-
tage of optimistic agents by optimally adjusting their
compensation contracts and highlight the potential bene-
fits of hiring such agents. This finding is consistent with
Heaton (2002, p. 34), who notes that “the interests of
principals may be served best by the design of mechan-
isms that exploit managerial irrationality rather than
squash it. For example, principals may design incentive
mechanisms that underpay irrational agents by exploiting
the agents' incorrect assessments of their ability or the
firm's risk.” The paper thus adds to our understanding of
the interplay between managerial beliefs and compensa-
tion, which may ultimately help reconcile some of the
unexplained heterogeneity in the remuneration of obser-
vationally similar individuals.
Finally, the results of my analyses have potentially
important implications for empirical studies that aim to
assess the effect of compensation and incentive schemes
on corporate practices such as investment and capital
structure decisions. Managerial optimism affects both
corporate actions and remuneration and may thus be an
important control variable when estimating the effect of
compensation schemes on these actions.
In addition to the new empirical results, the paper also
makes two methodological contributions. First, I show how to
construct a measure of managerial optimism that follows the
rationale proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005a,b, 2008)
and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) using information from
insider trading filings. Second, I propose a new measure of
managerial optimism, which is based on a firm's earnings
forecasts. Both measures can be constructed using publicly
available information from the Thomson Reuters insider
filings database and the First Call Historical Database.
Within the existing theoretical literature, the paper is
most closely related to the work of Gervais, Heaton, and
Odean (2011). In their model, the authors consider an
agent who is overconfident and therefore overestimates
the precision of a privately available signal regarding the
quality of an investment opportunity. If the principal
optimally adjusts the agent's pay to this bias, mildly
overconfident agents are compensated with less convex
contracts than their peers, whereas extremely overconfi-
dent agents are compensated with more convex contracts.
This paper differs in that I focus on managerial optimism
rather than overconfidence. That is, I consider an agent
who believes that his projects are intrinsically better than
they really are rather than an agent who overestimates the
precision of some signal regarding the project's quality.
In the empirical literature, Graham, Harvey, and Puri
(2013) is the most closely related work. Using data obtained
from psychometric tests, the authors show, among other
findings, that CEOs with a higher risk-aversion are less likely
to be compensated with performance-based pay, and that
CEOs with a higher rate of time preference are more likely to
be paid in salary. Other related papers on the effects of
managerial biases and personal characteristics on corporate
decisions and outcomes include Brown and Sarma (2007) and
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) on the impact on acquisitions,
and Hribar and Yang (2013) on the impact on forecast
behavior and earnings management. Hirshleifer, Low, and
Teoh (2012) provide evidence that overconfident CEOs invest
more in innovation. Hilary, Hsu, and Segal (2013) show that
CEOs become more optimistic after a series of past successes
and that more optimistic CEOs appear to exert greater effort.
Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2011)
provide evidence regarding the influence on CEO turnover,
and Hackbarth (2008, 2009) examines the implications for
capital structure decisions. Keiber (2005) considers a setting in
which both the principal and the agent are overconfident, and
Gervais and Goldstein (2007) show how agents who over-
estimate the marginal productivity of their effort can amelio-
rate free-rider and effort coordination problems. Kaplan,
Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012) investigate which CEO char-
acteristics are related to hiring decisions, investment deci-
sions, and firm performance.
Potential explanations concerning why agents with
biased beliefs may rise to the rank of CEO in the first place
are provided, for example, by Englmaier (2007, 2010, 2011)
and Goel and Thakor (2008). Furthermore, a large litera-
ture in psychology documents a widespread tendency in
all humans to be overly optimistic regarding their abilities
and their future. As Taylor and Brown (1988, p. 197)
summarize: “A great deal of research in social, personality,
clinical, and developmental psychology documents that
normal individuals possess unrealistically positive views of
themselves, an exaggerated belief in their ability to control
the environment, and a view of the future that maintains
that their future will be far better than the average
person's.” Evidence that such biases extend to manage-
ment students, entrepreneurs, and corporate presidents is
provided, for example, by Camerer and Lovallo (1999),
Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988), and Larwood and
Whittaker (1977).
2. Hypotheses and data
2.1. Hypotheses
The following section briefly lays out the predicted
effect of CEO optimism on CEO compensation. A principal–
agent model that formally derives the hypotheses is
presented in Appendix A. The intuition is as follows: An
optimistic CEO believes good outcomes to be more likely
than they really are and thus overestimates the probability
of success and the firm's future prospects. It follows that
an optimistic CEO overestimates the value of compensa-
tion claims that are contingent on successful outcomes
because he overestimates the probability that these out-
comes will be realized.3 Fewer incentive claims that are
contingent on such outcomes will therefore be sufficient to
satisfy the CEO's participation and incentive compatibility
constraints. As a consequence, compared to an unbiased
3 Empirical evidence that optimistic mangers indeed overestimate
the value of their stock options is provided, for example, by Sautner,
Weber, and Glaser (2010).
C.A. Otto / Journal of Financial Economics 114 (2014) 366–404368
CEO, an optimist is willing to accept a compensation
contract that specifies fewer incentive claims. Further-
more, using unbiased beliefs to value the claims, the total
compensation of an optimistic CEO will be lower than that
of his peers.
As a simple example, consider the following setup.
Suppose that the CEO accepts only compensation packages
that he values at at least $100. Otherwise, he prefers his
outside option. Moreover, suppose that at least $36 of the
$100 must be provided in the form of incentive pay.
Otherwise, the CEO does not exert any effort. Finally,
assume that only two compensation instruments are
available: dollar bills and incentive claims. Dollar bills are
valued equally by the firm's owners and the CEO at $1
each. Incentive claims are valued by the firm's owners at
their expected payoff, say at $10 per claim. The risk-averse
CEO, however, values incentive claims at less than their
expected payoff, say at $6. Thus, the optimal compensation
package comprises $64 in cash and six incentive claims.
Consider now an optimistic CEO who overestimates the
probability that the incentive claims will pay off. This CEO
values each incentive claim at more than $6, say at $9.
It follows that the optimal compensation package for the
optimist comprises $64 in cash and four incentive claims.
An optimistic CEO thus receives fewer incentive claims
and—valuing claims using unbiased beliefs—lower total
compensation than an unbiased CEO.4 Hypotheses 1 and 2
summarize these predictions:
H1: Lower incentive compensation. More optimistic
CEOs receive lower incentive compensation than less
optimistic CEOs.
H2: Lower total compensation. More optimistic CEOs
receive lower total compensation than less optimistic CEOs.
2.2. Data
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, I examine the empirical
relation between optimism and compensation for CEOs of
US firms. I assess a given CEO's optimism with two
separate measures. The first measure is based on the
CEO's option exercise decisions and follows the rationale
proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005a,b, 2008) and
Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011). The measure identifies a
CEO as optimistic if he holds on to his stock options longer
than is expected from a CEO with unbiased beliefs.5 The
intuition behind this approach is that a risk-averse CEO is
expected to reduce his exposure to company-specific risk
by exercising his stock options early if they are sufficiently
deep in the money (see, e.g., Hall and Murphy, 2002;
Huddart and Lang, 1996). Thus, holding on to an option
until late in the option's life—despite the fact that the
option is already deep in the money—is considered evi-
dence for optimistic beliefs about the company's pro-
spects. This rationale is consistent with the principal–
agent model presented in Appendix A, in which the
delayed exercising of incentive claims arises endogenously
as the outcome of an optimist's utility maximization.
Hence, the use of delayed option exercises as a proxy for
a CEO's optimism provides a close link between the
empirical analysis and the theory from which the hypoth-
eses regarding an optimist's compensation are derived.
The second measure is based on the comparison
between the earnings per share (EPS) that were forecast
by the firm during the CEO's tenure and the EPS that were
actually realized. The idea behind this approach is that
optimistic CEOs overestimate their firm's future perfor-
mance and should thus be more likely than their peers
to release forecasts that exceed the EPS that are realized
ex post. Note that an EPS forecast released by the firm is
likely to reflect the CEO's beliefs even though he may not
personally compute or announce it: It is unlikely that the
CEO would tolerate a forecast with which he strongly
disagrees. This intuition is consistent with the findings of
Hribar and Yang (2013), who provide evidence that firms
run by CEOs who are described as being optimistic in the
financial press are indeed more likely to issue forecasts
that exceed the earnings that are eventually realized.
I compute both optimism measures for each CEO-firm
combination based on each CEO's average behavior during
his tenure in a given firm. That is, I aim to capture the
CEO's average optimism with respect to the firm. There are
two reasons for this approach. First, the proposed mea-
sures almost certainly contain some noise that is unrelated
to the CEO's optimism. Averaging across all years helps
mitigate the influence of such noise on the measures.
Second, fluctuations of a CEO's optimism over short
horizons are less likely to have an effect on the structure
of his compensation than the CEO's average optimism,
which is more stable over time.
I use three main data sources for my empirical analysis:
information on the CEOs' compensation from Execucomp,
information on the CEOs' option exercises from the Thom-
son Reuters insider filings database, and information on
EPS forecasts, analyst consensus estimates, and realized
4 The example assumes that an optimistic CEO values incentive
claims less ($9) than the firm's owners ($10). In other words, the CEO's
optimism does not completely undo the effect of his risk-aversion. This is
the maintained assumption both in the formal model and in the
empirical analysis. A consequence of this assumption is that the CEO's
incentive compatibility constraint holds with equality when evaluated at
the optimal contract—exactly $36 are provided to the CEO in the form of
incentive claims. This is a sufficient condition for a negative effect of the
CEO's optimism on the amount of his incentive compensation. If,
however, the CEO's incentive compatibility constraint holds with slack,
then the amount of incentive pay is not, in general, a monotone function
of the CEO's optimism. To illustrate, consider two examples: a very
optimistic CEO who values incentive claims at $12.50, and an extremely
optimistic CEO who values incentive claims at $50. At the optimum, the
first CEO receives eight incentive claims, and the second CEO receives two
incentive claims. Thus, neither CEO's incentive compatibility constraint is
binding. However, the very optimistic CEO receives more incentive claims
than an unbiased CEO, while the extremely optimistic CEO receives less.
A formal analysis of the case in which the agent's incentive compatibility
constraint is not binding as well as an empirical investigation of a
potentially non-monotonic effect of optimism on compensation are
presented in Appendix B.
5 Note that this measure is indeed a measure of optimism in the
sense of an overestimation of the firm's mean future cash flows
(Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011). Despite differences in terminology—
the overestimation of a firm's future prospects, to which I refer as
optimism, is sometimes referred to as overconfidence in the literature—
the measure is not a measure of overconfidence in the sense of an
underestimation of variance.
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earnings from the First Call Historical Database. All data on
compensation, option exercises, and earnings forecasts are
obtained for the years between 1996 and 2005.6 Further-
more, I obtain financial information from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat as
well as data on the firms' board characteristics from
RiskMetrics.
2.2.1. Optimism measure based on option exercise decisions
(“LongHolder”)
The first measure for a CEO's optimism is based on the
CEOs' option exercise decisions and follows the rationale
proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005a,b, 2008) and
Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011). Information on the
CEOs' option exercises is obtained from the Thomson
Reuters insider filings database. The data files are designed
to capture all insider activity as reported on the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Forms 3, 4, 5, and 144,
and include additional information concerning the accu-
racy of the reported data in the form of a cleanse indicator
that denotes the overall level of confidence in each record.
Corporate insiders—individuals who have access to non-
public, material, insider information, including the CEO,
are required to file Forms 3, 4, and 5 for transactions
involving their companies' stock. For my analysis, Form 4 is
the relevant source of information as it indicates changes
in an insider's ownership position. This could be a pur-
chase, sale, option grant or exercise, or any other transac-
tion that causes a change in the ownership position.
I start with all Form 4 observations between January
1996 and December 2005 and only keep observations that
pertain to exercises of incentive stock options by CEOs and
that have cleanse indicators R, H, C, L, or I, indicating a
reasonable level of confidence in the accuracy of the data.
A description of the different cleanse indicators is provided
in Appendix C. Furthermore, I discard observations if the
following items are missing: the person ID that uniquely
identifies each CEO, the transaction date, the expiration
date of the options or information on the number of
securities exchanged in the transaction, the transaction
price adjusted for stock splits, or the share price on the
transaction date. As a final check, I make use of the fact
that option exercises are recorded in two separate tables
and keep only those observations that are listed in both
tables with the same transaction price. After these steps,
I am left with a “clean” list of all exercises of incentive
stock options.
For all exercise observations, I first calculate the time to
expiration at the time of exercise as the difference
between the expiration date of the options and the
transaction date. During this process, I drop an additional
20 observations with a reported expiration date before the
transaction date and four observations with an implied
time to expiration of more than 200 years, as these are
clearly data entry errors. Each observation in the sample is
then matched with the annual closing price of the under-
lying stock at the end of the preceding calendar year,
which I obtain from the CRSP database.7 I keep only those
observations for which price information is available and
calculate the moneyness of the options at the end of the
previous year as the difference between the closing price
of the preceding calendar year and the exercise price
divided by the exercise price. All prices are adjusted for
stock splits, and observations where the exercise price is
zero are dropped.
Then, for each observation, I assign an optimism
dummy that takes the value one if the options were
exercised within one year of their expiration date and at
least 40% in the money at the end of the preceding year.
Otherwise, the dummy takes the value zero. My analyses
are not sensitive to this cut-off. Consistent with the
findings of Malmendier and Tate (2008), the results are
similar if I use 20% or 60% instead of 40%.
Finally, I average the value of the optimism dummy for
each CEO across all observations that pertain to that CEO
within a given firm, weighting each exercise observation
by the number of options that were exercised. Weighting
observations by the profit that was realized in the transac-
tion—calculated as the product of the number of shares
exchanged in the transaction and the difference between
the share price on the transaction date and the exercise
price—or giving equal weight to all observations, yields
similar results. This procedure leads to the variable Long-
Holder, which can take on values between zero and one—
with higher values indicating more optimistic beliefs.
2.2.2. Optimism measure based on EPS forecasts
(“HighForecast”)
The second measure for a CEO's optimism is based on the
comparison of the EPS forecasts released by the firm with the
EPS that were eventually realized. More than 70% of all firms
in the Execucomp database provide such forecasts during the
sample period despite the fact that they are not legally obliged
to do so. This finding is consistent with the survey results
presented by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005): Execu-
tives consider EPS the most important performance measure
to be communicated to outsiders. The prime motive for
voluntarily disclosing such information, according to the
survey respondents, is promoting a reputation for transparent
and accurate reporting.
I begin my analysis with all company-issued EPS fore-
casts in the First Call Historical Database that were
announced between January 1996 and December 2005.
I keep only forecasts for the common stock of each firm
and drop observations if the announcement date falls on
or after the end of the fiscal period for which the
announcement was made, or on or after the date on which
6 Information on the CEOs' option exercises as recorded in the table
pertaining to derivative transactions in the Thomson Reuters insider
filings database is available only from 1996 onwards. Information on the
Black-Scholes values of the CEOs' option grants is available from the
Execucomp database only until 2005 due to changes in the reporting
requirements for equity-based compensation (Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board (FASB) 123). A benefit of this data restriction is that the
results of the empirical analyses are not confounded by the recent
financial crisis.
7 Matching observations with the stock price as of 12 months before
the expiration date of the options as in Malmendier and Tate (2005a,b,
2008) and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) would lead to a significant
drop in the percentage of matched observations (68% versus 92%).
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the actual EPS were announced. Furthermore, I drop
observations if any of these three dates is missing, or if
information on the EPS that were eventually realized is not
available. If a firm updates a prior forecast, I only keep the
update.
For each forecast and realization pair, I then assign a
dummy that indicates whether or not the forecast was
“optimistic,” relative to the ex post realized EPS. If the
forecast was issued in the form of an EPS range (62% of all
forecasts), then the dummy variable takes the value one if
the lower bound of the range exceeds the EPS that were
eventually realized. If the forecast was a point estimate
(38% of all forecasts), then the dummy variable takes the
value one if this point estimate exceeds the ex post
realized EPS. Thereafter, for each year and each firm,
I average the dummies across all forecast-realization pairs,
thus calculating the fraction of forecasts within each year
that were higher than the actual EPS. For each CEO-firm
combination, I then calculate the equally weighted average
of these fractions across all years. The intuition behind this
two-step procedure is to first measure a CEO's optimism
on a yearly basis and to then compute the average
optimism across all years. I denote the resulting variable
HighForecast, which can take on values between zero and
one. HighForecast is equal to zero if all EPS forecasts are
lower than the EPS that are eventually realized. It is equal
to one if all forecasts are higher than the actual EPS. Thus,
higher values of the variable HighForecast are indicative of
more optimistic beliefs, as higher values denote a larger
fraction of forecasts that appear to be too high ex post.
In addition to the optimism measure HighForecast,
I construct two additional variables for each CEO-firm
combination that are based on the forecasting behavior
of the CEOs. The first additional variable, denoted Fore-
castLead, measures the average number of days between
the date on which a forecast was issued and the end date
of the relevant fiscal period. On average, the final forecast
(or last update) is announced 91 days before the end of the
fiscal period. However, forecasts that ex post exceed the
realized EPS tend to be issued earlier (on average, 112 days
before the fiscal period end date) than forecasts that ex
post do not exceed the realized EPS (issued on average 72
days before the end of the fiscal period). To account for
such differences in the timing of EPS forecasts, I include
ForecastLead as a control variable in all regression analyses
that use the optimism measure HighForecast.
The second additional variable, denoted ForecastWidth,
measures the average width of the EPS ranges that are
forecast by the CEOs. I calculate the relative width of each
forecast range as the difference between the upper and the
lower bound of the forecast, divided by the midpoint of the
range. If the forecast is a point estimate, I set the relative
width to zero. Finally, to remove the effect of outliers, I
winsorize the variable ForecastWidth at the 1% level.
I control for the average width of the forecast ranges in all
regressions that use the optimism measure HighForecast for
two reasons. First, range forecasts are classified as optimistic if
the lower bound of the forecast exceeds the ex post realized
EPS. Thus, all else equal, forecasts that specify a wider range
are less likely to be classified as optimistic. Second, the average
width of the EPS forecasts can be interpreted as a measure of
the CEO's confidence in the forecasts: A more confident CEO
should be more likely to issue a narrower forecast range or
even a point estimate. Thus, lower values of ForecastWidth are
indicative of more confidence. Controlling for each CEO's
confidence may be important, because the optimal compen-
sation arrangement may not only be influenced by the CEO's
optimism but also by his (over-)confidence as shown, for
example, in Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2011).8 In addition to
ForecastWidth, I also include its squared value in the regres-
sion specifications because the results of Gervais, Heaton, and
Odean (2011) suggest that the effect of overconfidence on
compensation is non-monotonic.
Interestingly, the correlation coefficient between Fore-
castWidth and HighForecast across all CEO-firm combina-
tions is 0.134 and significant at the 1% level. This is
evidence for a positive correlation between optimism and
(over-)confidence: More optimistic CEOs are also more
confident in their earnings forecasts. The correlation
coefficient between ForecastWidth and LongHolder, is
0.072 and significant at the 5% level.
2.2.3. Option characteristics for optimistic and non-
optimistic CEOs
Table 1 presents a first glance at the option compensa-
tion of optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs. Using informa-
tion obtained from the Execucomp database, I compute
the average Black-Scholes value of the option grants as
well as the average number of options awarded per grant
for each CEO-firm combination in the sample. Further-
more, I compute the average maturity and moneyness of
the options, weighting each grant observation by the
number of options that were awarded. Maturity is calcu-
lated as the difference in years between the year in which
the options were granted and the year in which they
expire. Moneyness is the difference between the firm's
share price on the grant date and the exercise price
divided by the exercise price. To remove the effect of
outliers, I winsorize Moneyness at the 1% level.
In addition, using the insider filings data obtained from
Thomson Reuters, I compute the average number of years
between the vesting date of the options and their expiration
date (Exercise window) as well as the average number of
years that the CEO waited after the vesting date before
exercising his options (Waited until exercised). As before,
observations are weighted by the number of exercised
options.
The CEOs in the sample are classified based on the
optimism measure LongHolder in Panel A and based on
HighForecast in Panel B. As can be seen from the first two
rows in both panels, the average option grant awarded
to an optimist has a lower Black-Scholes value and con-
tains fewer options than the average grant awarded to a
non-optimist. Both findings are consistent with Hypoth-
esis 1: More optimistic CEOs receive lower incentive
compensation than less optimistic CEOs. The differences
8 As mentioned in the Introduction, the distinction between over-
confidence and optimism is sometimes blurred in the literature. In this
paper, an agent is considered overconfident if he believes that informa-
tion he possesses is more precise than it really is. An optimist, however,
simply believes that good outcomes are more likely than they really are.
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in the average Black-Scholes value and in the average
number of options per grant are significant at the 5% level
in Panel A. In Panel B, the differences are not statistically
significant.9
On average, the granted options have a maturity that
exceeds nine years and are slightly out of the money on
the day of the grant. While I do not find any evidence for a
statistically significant difference in the average money-
ness of the options granted to non-optimists and
optimists, Panel A shows that the average maturity of
the non-optimists' options is larger than the average
maturity of the optimists' options. The difference, how-
ever, is economically small. Using a stock price of $33, an
annual volatility of 45%, a risk-free rate of 4.9%, a dividend
yield of 2.7%, and assuming that the option was granted at
the money, the Black-Scholes value of a call option with 9.4
years to maturity is $14.34. The value of an option with 9.1
years to maturity is $14.24. Thus, the difference in matur-
ity translates into a difference in value of $0.10 or 0.7%.10
Table 1
Option characteristics for optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs.
This table presents descriptive statistics for the options that are granted to CEOs who are optimistic and to CEOs who are not optimistic. CEOs are
classified based on the optimism measure LongHolder in Panel A and based on HighForecast in Panel B. The sample period is 1996 to 2005. Ln(Black-
Scholes value) is the natural logarithm of the average Black-Scholes value of option grants (in $0000). Number of options per grant is the average number of
options per grant (in '000). Maturity of granted options is the average difference in years between the year in which the options were granted and the year
in which they expire. Moneyness at grant date is the average difference between the share price on the grant date and the exercise price divided by the
exercise price. Exercise window is the average number of years between the options' vesting and expiration dates. Waited until exercised is the average
number of years the CEO waited until exercising after the options' vesting date. The unit of observation is a CEO-firm combination. Significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level is denoted by nnn, nn, and n, respectively, for a two-tailed t-test of the null hypothesis of equal means against the alternative of
unequal means.
Panel A
Non-optimistic CEOs Optimistic CEOs
(LongHolder ¼0) (LongHolder ¼1)
Mean Mean Difference
N (Std. dev.) N (Std. dev.) (Std. err.)
Ln(Black-Scholes value) 757 7.07 230 6.85 0.22nn
(1.20) (1.27) (0.09)
Number of options per grant 757 196.5 230 158.8 37.6nn
(320.9) (202.0) (17.7)
Maturity of granted options 757 9.42 230 9.05 0.37nnn
(1.19) (1.74) (0.12)
Moneyness at grant date (in %) 757 0.11 230 0.35 0.25
(2.24) (2.79) (0.20)
Exercise window 534 7.58 173 6.32 1.26n
(8.95) (7.70) (0.70)
Waited until exercised 534 3.58 173 6.10 2.52nnn
(8.69) (7.72) (0.70)
Panel B
Non-optimistic CEOs
(HighForecast ¼0)
Optimistic CEOs
(HighForecast ¼1)
Mean Mean Difference
N (Std. dev.) N (Std. dev.) (Std. err.)
Ln(Black-Scholes value) 541 7.07 537 6.95 0.11
(1.25) (1.24) (0.08)
Number of options per grant 541 243.1 537 198.6 44.5
(567.5) (433.3) (30.7)
Maturity of granted options 541 9.43 537 9.29 0.14
(1.49) (1.49) (0.09)
Moneyness at grant date (in %) 541 0.13 537 0.08 0.05
(2.66) (1.94) (0.14)
Exercise window 147 6.15 187 7.52 1.37n
(3.08) (10.03) (0.78)
Waited until exercised 147 3.40 187 4.84 1.44n
(2.72) (10.10) (0.77)
9 The differences in the average Black-Scholes value and in the
average number of options per grant reported in Panel B are significant
at the 10% level in a one-sided t-test against the alternative that optimists
receive lower-valued grants and fewer options per grant than non-
optimists.
10 $33, 45%, and 2.7% are the average stock price, volatility, and
dividend yield in the sample. The average risk-free rate used by Execu-
comp to compute Black-Scholes values during the sample period is 4.9%.
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The difference in the average maturity reported in Panel B
is even smaller and not statistically significant.
The average time-span between the vesting date of the
options and their expiration date is longer than six years
for both optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs. Nonetheless,
optimistic CEOs wait significantly longer before exercising
their options than non-optimistic CEOs. This holds both for
CEOs who are classified based on their exercise behavior
(Panel A) as well as for CEOs who are classified based on
their forecast behavior (Panel B). On average, non-
optimists wait about three and a half years before exercis-
ing their options (3.6 years in Panel A and 3.4 years in
Panel B), while optimists, on average, wait around five to
six years, depending on which measure is used to classify
CEOs as either optimistic or non-optimistic.
Overall, the results of this analysis suggest that while
the maturity and moneyness of the awarded options are
comparable for non-optimistic and optimistic CEOs, opti-
mists on average receive smaller and lower-valued grants.
Moreover, while on average both non-optimists and opti-
mists are free to exercise their options during a period of
at least six years, optimistic CEOs decide to wait signifi-
cantly longer than non-optimistic CEOs to do so.
2.2.4. Compensation and CEO and firm characteristics
Information on the CEOs' compensation as well as on
their holdings of company stock and options is obtained
from the Execucomp database and matched with the
information on the CEOs' optimism. I keep only observa-
tions for which at least one of the optimism measures is
available. In addition to the compensation data, I obtain
financial and balance sheet information as well as infor-
mation on the firms' board composition from the CRSP,
Compustat, and RiskMetrics databases. For each firm and
in each year, I calculate the firm's market capitalization,
leverage, market-to-book ratio, and return on assets, as
well as the firm's cash holdings and research and devel-
opment (R&D) and capital expenditures (Capex) scaled by
total assets. Leverage is calculated as total long-term debt
divided by total assets. The market-to-book ratio is calcu-
lated as the sum of the firm's market capitalization and
total long-term debt divided by total assets. Return on
assets is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT) divided by total assets. In addition, I compute the
firm's yearly stock returns as well as the standard devia-
tion of the monthly returns over the previous five years.
Finally, I calculate the total number of directors and the
fraction of independent directors on the firm's board.
I drop observations if there is no information on the
CEO's total compensation, salary, or bonus, the Black-
Scholes value of option awards or value of restricted stock
grants, or if the indicated value of the CEO's total com-
pensation is zero. I also drop one observation for which the
sum of the CEO's bonus payments and option and stock
grants exceeds the indicated value of his total compensa-
tion. Furthermore, I drop observations if information on
the CEO's tenure, age, or gender is not available, or if the
indicated values of tenure or age are negative. If the
variable “age” is missing in the Execucomp data but can
be recovered using information from prior or subsequent
years, I do not drop the observation.
One assumption of the model used to derive the
hypotheses regarding the effect of optimism on compen-
sation is that contingent claims are necessary to incenti-
vize the CEO. This assumption is important because the
CEO's optimism affects his compensation through the
overvaluation of such claims. To focus on cases that are
more consistent with the assumptions of the model, I thus
drop observations if the CEO has neither received any
incentive stock options during the current year nor in any
preceding sample year. In that case, an optimistic CEO
cannot hold on to his options or overestimate their value
as is implied by my model.11 After this step, I am left with a
final sample of 11,477 observations, covering 2,559 CEOs
and 1,889 firms. A total of 601 of these firms change CEOs
at least once during the sample period. However, of the
2,559 CEOs, I observe only 27 as CEO in more than
one firm.
3. Empirical analysis and results
3.1. Summary statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the final sample
of 11,477 observations.12 Information on the CEOs' com-
pensation is presented in Panel A, and information on the
CEOs' tenure, age, and gender, as well as on the two
optimism measures LongHolder and HighForecast, is pre-
sented in Panel B. The average total compensation per year
is about $5.7 million. The standard deviation is large ($11.9
million), and the maximum exceeds $600 million. The
mean salary, bonus, and value of restricted stock grants are
$0.67, $0.85, and $0.56 million per year, respectively, and
the average Black-Scholes value of option grants is $3.1
million. The average fraction of incentive pay—bonus,
restricted stock, and stock options—in the CEOs' total
compensation is 65%.
The average tenure and age of the CEOs is seven and 55
years, respectively, and 98% of the observations pertain to
male CEOs. The mean value of the optimism measure
LongHolder across all observations is 0.32. The average
value of the variable HighForecast across all observations
is 0.49, indicating that on average, the CEOs meet or beat
their own earnings forecasts slightly more often than they
miss them.
The standard deviation of the variable LongHolder
across all observations is 0.41, and the standard deviation
of HighForecast is 0.37. The standard deviation of Long-
Holder between firms is 0.39, and the within-firm standard
(footnote continued)
The summary statistics presented in Table 1 suggest that virtually all
options are granted at the money.
11 If I keep these observations, the empirical results are weaker, but
qualitatively unchanged.
12 The sample size for the optimism measure LongHolder (6,955) is
smaller than for HighForecast (10,147) because I can match fewer CEOs in
the Execucomp database with CEOs in the Thomson Reuters insider
filings database than I can match firms in Execucomp with firms in the
First Call Historical Database.
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deviation is 0.11. For the variable HighForecast, the standard
deviation between firms is 0.34, and the within-firm standard
deviation is 0.15. The correlation coefficient between Long-
Holder and HighForecast is 0.05 and significant at the 1% level.
Thus, the CEOs' behavior displays a certain degree of consis-
tency: Those CEOs who are more prone to making forecasts
that are too high are also more likely to hold on longer to their
in-the-money options.
Panel C presents summary statistics for the number of
exercise observations for each CEO-firm combination as
well as information on the distribution of the optimism
measure LongHolder. On average, there are eight exercise
decisions for each CEO-firm combination in the sample.
The maximum is as high as 161. For 55% of all CEO-firm
combinations, the value of LongHolder is zero, i.e., none of
the options exercised by the CEO were exercised within
one year of their expiration date and were at least 40% in
the money at the end of the preceding year. For 17% of all
CEO-firm combinations, the value of LongHolder is one,
i.e., all options were exercised within one year of their
expiration date, and all of them were at least 40% in the
money at the end of the year that precedes the exercise
date. Thus, for 72% of all CEO-firm combinations, the CEO
exercises either always late or never late. Changes in the
exercise behavior of a given CEO in a given firm are
observed for only 28% of all CEO-firm pairs.
Summary statistics for the number of forecast observa-
tions as well as information on the distribution of the
optimism measure HighForecast are presented in Panel D.
The mean number of EPS forecast observations per CEO-firm
Table 2
Summary statistics.
This table presents summary statistics for the final sample of 11,477 observations. The sample period is 1996 to 2005. The variables are as follows: Total
compensation is the CEO's total compensation (Execucomp item TDC1). Salary is the CEO's salary. Bonus is the amount of bonus payments. Restricted stock
is the dollar value of restricted stock grants. Options is the Black-Scholes value of option awards. Incentives/Total compensation is the sum of Bonus,
Restricted stock, and Options divided by Total compensation. Tenure is the number of years since the CEO has been appointed. Age is the CEO's age during
the year of the observation. Male is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the CEO is male. LongHolder is the measure of CEO optimism that is based
on the CEOs' option exercise decisions. HighForecast is the measure of CEO optimism that is based on the discrepancy between the firms' EPS forecasts and
the eventually realized EPS. Compensation variables are reported in $0000.
Panel A
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Total compensation 11,477 5,664 2,914 11,938 0 600,347
Salary 11,477 670 619 351 0 5,807
Bonus 11,477 846 450 1,538 0 43,512
Restricted stock 11,477 560 0 2,284 0 74,750
Options 11,477 3,087 1,042 10,654 0 600,347
Incentives/Total compensation 11,477 0.65 0.71 0.24 0.00 1.00
Panel B
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Tenure 11,477 7.0 5.0 6.8 0.0 52.0
Age 11,477 55.1 55.0 7.0 29.0 86.0
Male 11,477 0.98 1.00 0.12 0.00 1.00
LongHolder 6,955 0.32 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
HighForecast 10,147 0.49 0.47 0.37 0.00 1.00
Panel C
Exercise observations
per CEO-firm combination Fraction of CEO-firm combinations
Mean 8.0
Median 4.0 LongHolder ¼0 55%
Std. dev. 13.1 LongHolder A 0;1ð Þ 28%
Min 1.0 LongHolder ¼1 17%
Max 161.0
Panel D
Forecast observations
per CEO-firm combination Fraction of CEO-firm combinations
Mean 6.7
Median 4.0 HighForecast ¼ 0 24%
Std. dev. 6.5 HighForecast A 0;1ð Þ 52%
Min 1.0 HighForecast ¼ 1 24%
Max 35.0
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combination is 6.7, and the maximum is 35. For 24% of all
CEO-firm combinations, the forecast EPS are always lower
than or equal to the EPS that were eventually realized (High-
Forecast ¼0). For another 24% of all CEO-firm combinations,
the forecast earnings always exceed the actual earnings
(HighForecast ¼1). For the majority of CEO-firm combinations
(52%), the forecast EPS are sometimes too high and sometimes
too low (0o HighForecast o1).
3.2. Regression analyses
3.2.1. CEO selection and firm characteristics
This section presents the results of regression analyses
concerning the effect of a CEO's optimism on the different
components of his compensation as well as on his total
compensation. A natural concern regarding these analyses is
that optimistic CEOs are not randomly assigned to the
companies for which they work. Different firms may have
different levels of “preferred optimism” and appoint their
CEOs accordingly.
A growing literature in finance and economics has docu-
mented various effects that biased managers may have on
corporate policies, and the trade-off between the costs and
benefits of hiring an optimistic CEO may vary from firm to
firm. In particular, firms may differ in the amount of damage
that an optimistic CEO may cause by implementing “bad
projects.” Little damage may be caused, for example, if good
projects can be easily distinguished from bad ones and if
powerful control mechanisms can be put in place to validate
project proposals. However, if a lot of discretionmust be left to
the CEO, and if choosing between projects is particularly
difficult, the firm's owners may prefer not to appoint an
optimist if selecting the wrong project would cause a lot of
damage. This reasoning suggests that differences in firm
characteristics may help explain why some firms employ
more optimistic CEOs than others.
Table 3, Panel A, displays a comparison of firm char-
acteristics for companies that hire optimistic or non-
optimistic CEOs. Panel B compares the characteristics of
firms that hire a new CEO who is more optimistic than the
firm's previous CEO and the characteristics of firms that
change to a CEO who is less optimistic than the previous
CEO. All firm characteristics are measured at the end of the
year preceding the (new) CEO's appointment.13
Panel A reveals that firms that hire optimistic CEOs on
average have a lower market-to-book ratio, a lower stan-
dard deviation of stock returns, hold less cash (scaled by
total assets), and have lower R&D expenditures (scaled by
total assets) than firms that hire non-optimistic CEOs.14
To the extent that more R&D-intensive firms, firms with
more growth opportunities, and firms with more volatile
stock returns are firms for which project selection is
particularly important while distinguishing between good
and bad projects is particularly difficult, these results are
consistent with the intuition outlined above. Such firms
may prefer a lower level of optimism and may thus be less
likely to appoint optimistic CEOs. Furthermore, CEOs in
firms with larger cash holdings may have more discretion
in implementing projects without the approval of the
providers of outside financing. This is consistent with the
finding that firms with larger cash holdings appear to be
less likely to hire optimists.
Panel B focuses on firms that change to a new CEO. The
data reveal that the differences in firm characteristics are
much less pronounced between firms that change to a
new CEO who is more optimistic than the previous CEO
and firms that change to a less optimistic CEO. The average
market-to-book ratios and cash holdings are not signifi-
cantly different between the two groups of firms. The
differences in the standard deviations of the monthly stock
returns and the firms' R&D expenditures remain signifi-
cant—but only at the 10% level. The differences in all other
characteristics are not statistically significant.
Overall, Panel A provides some evidence that firm
characteristics that may be related to the ability to limit
the damage that a biased manager can cause by imple-
menting value-decreasing projects may be associated with
the likelihood of hiring a more or a less optimistic CEO.
Panel B, however, reveals that there are only a few and
weakly significant differences between the companies that
hire a CEO who is more optimistic than his predecessor
and those that hire a less optimistic CEO. Nevertheless, to
address the concern that each firm employs its CEO
according to its preferred level of optimism, I include a
dummy variable for each firm as well as the natural
logarithm of the firm's market capitalization, the standard
deviation of the monthly stock returns during the previous
five years, and the firm's leverage, market-to-book ratio,
cash holdings, and R&D expenditures as control variables
in the compensation regressions. Untabulated robustness
tests confirm that using the “historical” values of the firm
characteristics—measured at the end of the year that
precedes the CEO's appointment—instead of the contem-
poraneous values does not change my findings.
Note that the regression specification models each
firm's preferred level of optimism as the sum of two
components: a time-invariant, unobservable base level
and a time-varying component that can be expressed as
a linear function of the included firm characteristics. The
crucial identification assumption for my analyses is
13 In Panel A, CEOs for which the optimism measure LongHolder or
HighForecast is equal to 1 (0) are classified as optimistic (non-optimistic).
CEOs for which LongHolder is equal to 1 (0) but HighForecast is equal to 0
(1) are dropped from the sample. In Panel B, new CEOs are classified as
more (less) optimistic than the previous CEO if the value of LongHolder or
HighForecast is higher (lower) than for the previous CEO. Cases with an
increase (decrease) in LongHolder but a decrease (increase) in High-
Forecast are dropped from the sample.
14 The variable “R&D expenditures divided by total assets” is missing
for 53% of the observations in the sample. To avoid dropping such a large
fraction of the data, I set missing values equal to zero. Replacing missing
values instead with the average R&D intensity of all firms within the
(footnote continued)
same industry (based on the first two digits of the standard industrial
classification (SIC) code and calculated on a yearly basis) or dropping
observations for which the R&D intensity is missing does not change the
finding that firms that hire optimistic CEOs have lower R&D intensities
than firms that hire non-optimistic CEOs. In the compensation regres-
sions presented in Section 3.2.4, the dummy variable “R&D missing” takes
the value one if the variable “R&D expenditures divided by total assets”
has been set to zero due to a missing value.
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therefore that the difference between a CEO's actual level
of optimism and a firm's preferred level of optimism—
modeled as described—is as good as randomly assigned
(conditional on covariates).
An alternative way to address the concern that optimis-
tic CEOs are not randomly assigned would be to estimate a
“Heckman style” treatment effects model. However, several
aspects render this approach unappealing in my setup. First,
Table 3
Firm characteristics.
This table presents summary statistics for various firm characteristics. The sample period is 1996 to 2005. In Panel A, CEOs for which the optimism
measure LongHolder or HighForecast is equal to 1 (0) are classified as optimistic (non-optimistic). CEOs for which LongHolder is equal to 1 (0) but
HighForecast is equal to 0 (1) are dropped from the sample. In Panel B, new CEOs are classified as more (less) optimistic than the previous CEO if the value
of LongHolder or HighForecast is higher (lower) than for the previous CEO. Cases with an increase (decrease) in LongHolder but a decrease (increase) in
HighForecast are dropped from the sample. All characteristics are measured at the end of the year that precedes the year in which the (new) CEO was
appointed. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by nnn, nn, and n, respectively, for a two-tailed t-test of the null hypothesis of equal means
against the alternative of unequal means.
Panel A: Firms with non-optimistic or optimistic CEOs
CEO is non-optimistic CEO is optimistic
Mean Mean Difference
N (Std. dev.) N (Std. dev.) (Std. err.)
MktCap 791 5,881 437 6,584 702
(18,822) (27,683) (1,484)
Assets 880 8,677 475 9,910 1,232
(41,582) (35,101) (2,135)
Sales 876 4,095 475 4,646 550
(11,624) (11,424) (655)
Leverage 874 0.19 472 0.18 0.01
(0.20) (0.17) (0.01)
MtB 784 1.64 435 1.38 0.26nnn
(1.87) (1.46) (0.10)
Return 750 0.07 414 0.05 0.01
(0.71) (0.48) (0.04)
Std.return 772 0.13 426 0.11 0.02nnn
(0.07) (0.05) (0.004)
Cash/Assets 847 0.08 443 0.07 0.01nn
(0.11) (0.10) (0.006)
R&D/Assets 880 0.04 475 0.03 0.02nnn
(0.16) (0.06) (0.006)
Capex/Assets 819 0.06 444 0.07 0.001
(0.06) (0.06) (0.003)
EBIT/Assets 859 0.08 468 0.08 0.00
(0.16) (0.17) (0.01)
Panel B: Firms that change their CEO
New CEO is less optimistic New CEO is more optimistic
Mean Mean Difference
N (Std. dev.) N (Std. dev.) (Std. err.)
MktCap 290 15,170 133 9,650 5,520
(40,706) (27,554) (3,380)
Assets 290 16,060 133 20,922 4,863
(58,291) (106,100) (9,816)
Sales 290 8,886 133 6,324 2,562
(22,041) (12,601) (1,694)
Leverage 287 0.19 132 0.18 0.01
(0.15) (0.15) (0.02)
MtB 287 1.90 132 1.74 0.16
(2.15) (2.68) (0.27)
Return 287 0.02 133 0.02 0.03
(0.59) (0.55) (0.06)
Std.return 288 0.13 133 0.14 0.01n
(0.06) (0.07) (0.01)
Cash/Assets 282 0.08 131 0.09 0.01
(0.09) (0.12) (0.012)
R&D/Assets 290 0.04 133 0.03 0.01n
(0.06) (0.04) (0.005)
Capex/Assets 280 0.05 130 0.06 0.003
(0.04) (0.05) (0.005)
EBIT/Assets 290 0.09 133 0.09 0.00
(0.12) (0.08) (0.01)
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the measures of CEO optimism are continuous, and using a
binary variable for optimistic CEOs instead would lead to a
significant loss of information. Second, an incidental para-
meters problem would prevent me from including firm
dummies in the first stage of the selection model. This is
particularly unfortunate, as unobserved firm characteristics
are probably the prime reason for any selection concern in
the first place. Third, in the absence of an instrument for
CEO optimism, the control function derived from the
selection model would amount to nothing more than a
nonlinear combination of the control variables that are
already included in my specification. For these reasons, I
opt to address the selection concern instead by modeling
each firm's target level of optimism as described above.
3.2.2. Corporate governance and firm performance
A further concern one may have is that differences in
governance and firm performance are systematically
related to the CEO's option exercise and forecast behavior
as well as to his compensation. A powerful board of
directors may influence both the CEO's decisions to exer-
cise his stock options and the firm's EPS forecasts. More-
over, some CEOs may receive less compensation than their
peers because of their firm's poor performance. To address
these concerns, I include the size of each firm's board, the
percentage of independent directors, and the CEO's tenure,
as well as each firm's stock return during the fiscal year
and return on assets (EBIT divided by total assets) as
additional control variables in the regressions. Finally,
I include control variables for the CEO's gender and age
as well as dummy variables for each sample year.15
3.2.3. Regression specification
In summary, I estimate regressions of the following
form:
Lnðyijtþ1Þ ¼ αþβ  OptimismMeasureij
þγ0FirmCharacteristicsijtþδ0CEOCharacteristicsijt
þζ0Firmjþη0Yeartþεijt ; ð1Þ
where i, j, and t denote CEOs, firms, and years. That is,
I estimate the effect of optimism on pay by comparing the
compensation of CEOs who work for the same firm but
display different levels of optimism, controlling for time-
varying firm and CEO characteristics as well as differences
in the employment period.
Using Lnðyþ1Þ as the dependent variable, where y
denotes the compensation variable of interest (in $0000),
allows me to include observations where the value of the
compensation variable is equal to zero. Untabulated
regressions using LnðyÞ for y40 as the dependent variable
confirm my main findings. Furthermore, regressions in
which I replace the dependent variable with a dummy that
takes the value one if y40 provide some evidence that
optimistic CEOs are less likely than their peers to receive
option grants and bonus payments.
OptimismMeasure is the measure of CEO optimism
(either LongHolder or HighForecast). FirmCharacteristics is
a vector of time-varying firm characteristics. CEOCharac-
teristics is a vector of dummy variables for the CEO's
gender, age, and tenure. I include age and tenure dummies
rather than linear and quadratic terms to allow for a more
general relation between these variables and the CEO's
compensation.16 The estimation results, however, are not
sensitive to this choice of specification. Finally, to account
for heterogeneity and correlation of the error terms across
observations that pertain to the same firm, I calculate
heterogeneity-robust standard errors that allow for clus-
tering at the firm level in all specifications.
3.2.4. The effect of CEO optimism on CEO compensation
Table 4 presents the results regarding the effect of a
CEO's optimism on the different components of his com-
pensation as well as on his total compensation. The sample
sizes reported in Table 4 are smaller than those reported in
Table 2 due to the limited availability of some of the
control variables.
Panel A displays the results for the regressions using
the optimism measure LongHolder. Panel B displays the
results using HighForecast. The first column in both panels
reveals a negative and substantial association between the
CEO's optimism and the Black-Scholes value of his option
grants. The coefficient estimate on LongHolder is 0.752,
and the estimate for HighForecast is 0.514. Both are
significant at the 5% level. These results can be interpreted
as evidence that CEOs who are more prone to holding on
to their stock options despite the fact that the options are
already deep in the money and CEOs who are more likely
to announce EPS forecasts that prove to be too high ex post
indeed receive lower-valued option grants than their
peers. The coefficient estimates imply that an increase in
the value of LongHolder (HighForecast) by one within-firm
standard deviation leads to a decrease of about 8% (7%) in
the Black-Scholes value of the CEO's option grants. Thus,
the regression results are supportive of Hypothesis 1 and
indicative of a negative relation between a CEO's optimism
and the value of his option awards that is both statistically
and economically significant.
Regarding the value of restricted stock grants, neither
Panel A nor Panel B provide evidence for a significant
effect of the CEO's optimism. The coefficient estimate on
15 Using earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortiza-
tion (EBITDA) instead of EBIT to compute a firm's return on assets yields
very similar results. Untabulated regressions furthermore reveal that
additionally including the G-Index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, (2003),
the E-Index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), or the number of years
since the firm's initial public offering (IPO) (“firm age”) has virtually no
effect on the estimation results. Similarly, untabulated regressions that
include interaction terms between the measures of CEO optimism and
the size of the board, the percentage of independent directors, and the
CEO's tenure provide very little systematic evidence that the effect of
optimism on compensation varies with a firm's board characteristics or
the CEO's tenure.
16 The first age dummy takes the value one if the CEO's age is 40
years, the second takes the value one if the CEO's age is 41 years, and so
on. Finally, the 32nd dummy takes the value one if the CEO's age is above
70 years (1.5% of all observations). I do not include a dummy for CEOs
who are younger than 40 years of age (1.2% of all observations). The first
tenure dummy takes the value one if the CEO's tenure is one year, the
second takes the value one if the CEO's tenure is two years, and so on.
Finally, the 21st dummy takes the value one if the CEO's tenure is more
than 20 years (4.9% of all observations in my sample). I do not include a
dummy for the year in which the CEO is appointed (tenure¼0).
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Table 4
Effect of CEO optimism on CEO compensation.
This table presents the regression results regarding the effect of CEO optimism on CEO compensation. The sample period is 1996 to 2005. LongHolder is
the optimism measure based on the CEO's option exercise behavior. HighForecast is the optimism measure based on the EPS forecast behavior.
ForecastLead is the average number of days between the date on which a forecast was issued and the end date of the fiscal period for which the forecast
was made. ForecastWidth is the average width of the range of forecast EPS scaled by the midpoint of the range. Options is the Black-Scholes value of option
awards. Rst.stock is the value of restricted stock grants. Bonus, Salary, and Total are the CEO's bonus payments, salary, and total compensation. MktCap is
the firm's market capitalization. Std.return is the standard deviation of stock returns during the prior 60 months. Leverage is the ratio of total long-term
debt to total assets. MtB is the ratio of the sum of the firm's market capitalization and total long-term debt to total assets. Cash/Assets is the firm's cash
holdings scaled by total assets. R&D/Assets is the firm's R&D expenditures scaled by total assets. R&D missing is a dummy variable for observations for
which R&D/Assets is set to zero due to missing values. Boardsize is the number of directors on the firm's board, and Independent is the percentage of
independent directors. Return is the firm's stock return during the current fiscal year. EBIT/Assets is the firm's EBIT divided by total assets. Heterogeneity-
robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by nnn, nn,
and n, respectively.
Panel A
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
LongHolder 0.752nn 0.521 0.783nnn 0.213 0.201nn
(0.330) (0.492) (0.268) (0.133) (0.085)
Ln(MktCap) 0.635nnn 0.244nn 0.980nnn 0.073 0.457nnn
(0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.045) (0.027)
Std.return 0.338 0.377 4.126nnn 0.585 0.287
(1.134) (1.178) (0.941) (0.468) (0.315)
Leverage 0.588 0.274 0.216 0.087 0.019
(0.504) (0.475) (0.469) (0.073) (0.117)
MtB 0.014 0.002 0.072nnn 0.000 0.005
(0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.011) (0.008)
Cash/Assets 0.122 0.382 0.673 0.167 0.283
(0.743) (0.673) (0.641) (0.171) (0.200)
R&D/Assets 0.043 2.785n 3.819nn 0.417 0.206
(1.213) (1.423) (1.860) (0.333) (0.403)
R&D missing 0.309 0.340 0.324 0.169 0.005
(0.503) (0.380) (0.314) (0.119) (0.093)
Boardsize 0.034 0.032 0.064nn 0.013 0.001
(0.033) (0.040) (0.029) (0.012) (0.007)
Independent 0.130 0.757 0.044 0.204n 0.065
(0.428) (0.481) (0.365) (0.109) (0.103)
Return 0.096 0.069nn 0.185 0.007 0.047
(0.069) (0.029) (0.138) (0.009) (0.029)
EBIT/Assets 0.055 0.769 7.166nnn 0.327n 0.423n
(0.821) (0.630) (0.842) (0.199) (0.251)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.482 0.582 0.533 0.672 0.766
N 5,777 5,777 5,777 5,777 5,777
Panel B
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
HighForecast 0.514nn 0.213 0.638nnn 0.071 0.143n
(0.255) (0.312) (0.224) (0.090) (0.074)
ForecastLead 0.002nn 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ForecastWidth 0.272 0.170 1.125 0.338 0.015
(1.383) (1.966) (1.489) (0.838) (0.501)
ForecastWidth2 0.468 0.628 1.175 0.346 0.144
(1.506) (2.008) (1.616) (0.805) (0.551)
Ln(MktCap) 0.691nnn 0.116 0.856nnn 0.091nnn 0.427nnn
(0.086) (0.085) (0.092) (0.031) (0.025)
Std.return 1.529 1.575 3.007nn 0.613 0.098
(1.382) (1.275) (1.281) (0.423) (0.351)
Leverage 0.620 0.934nn 0.207 0.052 0.001
(0.422) (0.417) (0.400) (0.105) (0.103)
MtB 0.003 0.007 0.064nnn 0.008 0.001
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.007) (0.010)
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the optimism measure LongHolder in the second column
of Panel A is 0.521. The estimate for HighForecast in Panel
B is 0.213. Neither estimate is statistically significant at
any conventional level. However, for more than 70% of the
observations in the sample, the CEO does not receive any
restricted stock grants at all. Untabulated regressions in
which I replace Lnðyþ1Þ with LnðyÞ for y40 provide some
evidence that, conditional on receiving restricted stock
grants, the value of these grants tends to be lower for
optimistic CEOs than for their peers.
The third column of Table 4 presents the results for the
regressions regarding the amount of bonus payments that
the CEO receives. Both panels provide further evidence in
support of Hypothesis 1. The coefficient estimates on the
optimism measures are negative and significant at the 1%
level in Panels A and B, resembling the results for the value
of the options that are granted to the CEO. The point
estimate of 0.783 (0.638) for the coefficient on Long-
Holder (HighForecast) in Panel A (B) implies a reduction of
around 8% (9%) in the amount of bonus payments for an
increase in the value of LongHolder (HighForecast) by one
within-firm standard deviation. This indicates an econom-
ically significant effect of optimism on the amount of
bonus payments that the CEO receives.
The fourth column shows the results for the effect on the
CEO's salary. The coefficient estimates on the optimism
measures LongHolder in Panel A and HighForecast in
Panel B are negative, but not significantly different from zero.
Thus, these regressions do not provide significant evidence for
a negative relation between a CEO's optimism and his yearly
salary.
Finally, column 5 presents the results for the effect on the
CEO's total compensation. Both panels reveal negative and
significant coefficient estimates for the optimism measures
LongHolder (Panel A) and HighForecast (Panel B). The point
estimate for LongHolder is 0.201 and significant at the 5%
level. This implies a reduction in the CEO's total compensa-
tion of around 2% for an increase in the variable LongHolder
by one within-firm standard deviation. The coefficient esti-
mate on HighForecast is 0.143, significant at the 10% level,
and also implies a reduction by about 2% for an increase in
the optimism measure by one within-firm standard devia-
tion. Thus, both panels provide evidence for a negative effect
of a CEO's optimism on his total compensation and are
supportive of Hypothesis 2. The negative association
between a CEO's optimism and his total compensation is of
course not entirely surprising, given the results regarding the
negative impact of optimism on the value of the option
grants and bonus payments.
3.2.5. The effect of CEO optimism on discretionary cash
bonuses
In the model that is used to derive the predictions
regarding the effect of optimism on compensation, the
different compensation claims are specified ex ante so that
the CEO's participation and incentive compatibility constraints
are satisfied. The CEO's optimism affects these constraints
and, through this channel, the compensation claims. Com-
pensation components, however, that are not specified to
satisfy these constraints (but chosen for any other reason) will
not be affected: If the optimal amount of such payments does
not depend on the participation and incentive compatibility
constraints, then it does not depend on the CEO's optimism
either.
A case in point are discretionary cash bonuses. In the
model, such bonuses are not part of the optimal contract.
Instead, all bonuses are specified ex ante and contingent
on verifiable performance targets. In the data, however,
some bonuses may be awarded ex post and at the discre-
tion of the board. To the extent that the amount of these
bonuses does not depend on the CEO's participation and
incentive compatibility constraints, there should be no
relation between the realized bonuses and the CEO's
optimism. To test this prediction, I examine whether the
effect of CEO optimism on the amount of bonus payments
Table 4 (continued )
Panel B
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
Cash/Assets 0.612 0.258 1.501nnn 0.165 0.251
(0.667) (0.600) (0.551) (0.120) (0.181)
R&D/Assets 0.197 2.552n 3.333nn 0.660 0.385
(1.450) (1.471) (1.536) (0.469) (0.538)
R&D missing 0.032 0.557 0.122 0.087 0.119
(0.352) (0.364) (0.259) (0.069) (0.074)
Boardsize 0.016 0.023 0.062nn 0.026n 0.010
(0.027) (0.035) (0.028) (0.013) (0.007)
Independent 0.155 0.320 0.100 0.222nn 0.072
(0.378) (0.402) (0.302) (0.105) (0.093)
Return 0.114n 0.123nnn 0.297 0.009 0.048n
(0.068) (0.028) (0.186) (0.008) (0.026)
EBIT/Assets 0.346 0.417 8.558nnn 0.047 0.595nn
(0.680) (0.575) (0.771) (0.174) (0.239)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.447 0.534 0.519 0.732 0.723
N 8,238 8,238 8,238 8,238 8,238
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is weaker if the total bonuses I observe are more likely to
contain a larger fraction of discretionary bonuses.
De Angelis and Grinstein (2012) hand-collect informa-
tion on CEO compensation in Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500
firms from the 2007 proxy statements. They find that
during the fiscal year 2007, cash bonuses that the firms
reported as “non-equity-awards” were more likely to be
awarded for achieving pre-specified performance targets,
while cash bonuses that the firms reported as “annual cash
bonuses” were more likely to be awarded at the discretion
of the board. Building on this finding, I use the fraction of
presumably discretionary bonuses that are reported dur-
ing the fiscal year 2007 as a proxy for the fraction of
discretionary bonuses during my sample period. That is,
for each firm in my sample, I define
D2007 
Annual cash bonuses in 2007
Annual cash bonuses in 2007þNon-equity-awards in 2007
ð2Þ
and include the interaction between D2007 and the mea-
sures of CEO optimism as an additional variable in the
regressions relating the amount of total bonus payments
to the CEO's optimism.17
Table 5 presents the results.18 The coefficient estimates
on the optimism measures are negative and significant at
the 1% level. The coefficient estimates on the interaction
terms with D2007 are positive and significant at the 5%
level. Further, unreported hypothesis tests reveal that the
sum of the coefficients on the optimism measures and the
interaction terms is not statistically different from zero.
That is, the null hypothesis that CEO optimism does not
affect the bonuses in firms that only report presumably
discretionary bonuses in 2007 cannot be rejected.
The empirical results presented in Tables 4 and 5 thus
provide evidence that, on average, CEO optimism has a
negative effect on the amount of bonus payments that the
CEO receives. This finding is consistent with the predic-
tions of my model if the bonuses are largely the result of
compensation schemes that were designed to satisfy the
CEO's participation and incentive compatibility constraints
ex ante.19 Indeed, De Angelis and Grinstein (2012) find that
86% of the firms in their sample use pre-specified perfor-
mance awards while only 20% use discretionary bonuses.
The finding that the effect of CEO optimism is weaker if
the bonuses are more likely to be discretionary is consis-
tent with my model to the extent that the amount of such
bonuses is determined ex post, at the discretion of the
board, and independent of the CEO's participation and
incentive compatibility constraints ex ante.
4. Alternative explanations and robustness checks
4.1. Alternative explanations for the late exercising
of in-the-money options
A potential concern one may have is that the optimism
measure LongHolder is confounded by variables other
than optimism that influence the CEO's exercise beha-
vior.20 Low dividend yields, board pressure, or inside
information, for example, may cause some CEOs to exer-
cise their options later than their peers. Moreover, some
CEOs may simply procrastinate and therefore exercise
their options at the last moment before they expire.
However, while such circumstances may influence the
exercise behavior of the CEOs, it is not clear that they will
bias the results of the subsequent analyses. To the extent
that dividend yields, board pressure, and the access to
inside information are time-invariant firm-level character-
istics, they will be absorbed by the firm fixed effects in the
compensation regressions. Moreover, in unreported con-
ditional logit models with firm fixed effects, I do not find
any evidence that a firm's dividend yield or the size of the
board and the percentage of inside directors have a
significant influence on the decision to hold in-the-
money options until the last year before expiration.
Unreported regressions furthermore confirm that includ-
ing a firm's dividend yield (dividends paid in year t divided
by the stock price at the end of year t1) in the
compensation regressions does not change the results.
Regarding the effect of inside information, Malmendier
and Tate (2005a,b, 2008) and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan
(2011) show that, on average, the CEOs do not profit from
holding on to their options and would have been better off by
exercising earlier and investing the proceeds in the stock
market. This finding is inconsistent with an alternative story
that explains the decision to hold on to the options with
inside information. Consistent with these results, I find that in
my sample, the options that were exercised “late” by the CEOs
were on average deeper in the money at the end of the
preceding year than on the exercise date. Thus, the CEOs
would have been better off by exercising earlier than by
holding on to the options, which is inconsistent with an
explanation based on inside information. Both findings are
consistent with the results of Jenter (2005), who uses insider
trading patterns to identify divergences in top managers'
perceptions of fundamental value and market valuations
and finds little evidence that the use of inside information
can explain the trading behavior.
Concerning procrastination as an alternative explana-
tion for the late exercising of the options, I examine
whether or not the CEOs have filed any other insider
17 The sample average of D2007 is 0.16. For 75% (12%) of the observa-
tions in my sample, D2007 is equal to zero (one). I do not include D2007
itself because I include firm fixed effects in each regression.
18 The reported sample sizes are smaller than in Table 4 because
I cannot obtain information on the amount of bonuses reported as
“annual cash bonuses” and “non-equity-awards” in 2007 for all firms in
my sample.
19 The intuition is that an optimistic CEO believes ex ante that the
contingencies under which he will receive the bonus payments (e.g., that
a certain performance target will be met) are more likely than they really
are. Thus, for a given performance target, an optimistic CEO will agree
ex ante to a lower promised bonus than his peers. Or, alternatively, for a
given promised bonus, an optimist will agree ex ante to a higher
performance target. The lower promised bonuses that were sufficient
to satisfy the optimistic CEO's incentive compatibility and participation
constraints ex ante will then translate into lower realized bonuses
ex post. This effect occurs on average as well as conditional on realized
performance, consistent with the empirical finding that the bonuses of
optimistic CEOs are lower even after controlling for firm performance.
20 Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2008), and Malmendier, Tate, and
Yan (2011) provide a detailed discussion.
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transactions in the year (the two years) prior to the
exercise observations. In 73% (82%) of all cases in which
an option exercise satisfies the LongHolder criteria, the
CEO filed at least one other transaction in the prior year
(the two prior years). This result resembles the findings in
Malmendier and Tate (2008). Moreover, these percentages
are the same for exercise observations that do not fulfill
the LongHolder criteria. Thus, there does not appear to be
any evidence that the CEOs simply procrastinate when it
comes to exercising their options.
Finally, one may be concerned that some CEOs may be
more risk-tolerant or more diversified than others and
therefore hold on longer to their in-the-money options.
These concerns are particularly hard to tackle, as I have
little means to directly assess a given CEO's risk-aversion,
nor do I observe the CEO's entire wealth portfolio. How-
ever, additional analyses based on the CEOs' holdings of
company stock and options and the fraction of incentives
in the CEOs' total compensation that are presented in
Section 4.5 provide evidence that the empirical findings
are unlikely to be explained by systematic differences in
the CEOs' diversification or risk-tolerance.
4.2. EPS forecasting and sample selection
A potential concern regarding the previous analyses
using the optimism measure HighForecast is that this
variable can only be constructed for CEO-firm combina-
tions for which at least one EPS forecast is available. Firms,
however, are not obliged to provide such forecasts and
decide whether or not to do so voluntarily. If the determi-
nants of the decision to provide EPS forecasts—and thus,
whether or not to enter into my sample—are correlated
with the determinants of the CEO's compensation, then
the previous analyses may suffer from a sample selection
bias. This section provides empirical evidence that alle-
viates these concerns.
Table 6 provides summary statistics for all firms in the
Execucomp database that do issue EPS forecasts during my
sample period and those that do not. In addition to the
firm characteristics already examined in Section 3, Table 6
also shows summary statistics for the variable ForecastIs-
sued, which indicates whether or not a firm has issued at
least one EPS forecast during a given year. Furthermore,
the table presents summary statistics for five additional
variables that have been shown in the literature (e.g.,
Hribar and Yang, 2013) to be associated with the decision
to issue EPS forecasts: #Analysts is the number of analysts
that provide EPS forecasts for the firm. Equity issue is a
dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm has
issued equity during the year. Debt issue is a dummy
variable indicating whether or not the firm has issued debt
during the year. Earnings volatility is the standard devia-
tion of each firm's income before extraordinary items
scaled by total assets (computed over the prior five years).
Inst. ownership is the fraction of institutional owners
among the firm's shareholders. Information on the num-
ber of analysts that follow a firm comes from the First Call
Historical Database. Data on equity issuance are obtained
from Thomson One, and data on debt issuance come from
Compustat. Information on each firm's institutional own-
ership is obtained from Thomson-Reuters 13F data.
Several results emerge from the comparison of firm
characteristics. First, more than 70% of all firms issue EPS
forecasts. Second, the firms that do issue forecasts do not
do so every year: The conditional mean of the variable
ForecastIssued is 0.56, indicating that the firms issue EPS
forecasts about every other year. Third, firms issuing EPS
forecasts differ from firms not issuing forecasts. In
Table 5
Effect of CEO optimism on discretionary cash bonuses.
This table presents regression results regarding the effect of CEO
optimism on bonus payments in firms that are more likely to use a
larger fraction of discretionary bonuses. The sample period is 1996 to
2005. D2007 is the ratio of bonuses reported as “annual cash bonuses” to
the sum of bonuses reported as “annual cash bonuses” and bonuses
reported as “non-equity-awards” during the fiscal year 2007. All other
variables are defined as in Table 4. Heterogeneity-robust standard errors
that allow for clustering at the firm level are reported in parentheses.
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by nnn, nn, and n,
respectively.
Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1)
LongHolder 0.997nnn
(0.337)
LongHolder x D2007 2.319nn
(1.134)
HighForecast 0.988nnn
(0.268)
HighForecast x D2007 1.859nn
(0.744)
ForecastLead 0.001
(0.001)
ForecastWidth 2.555
(1.880)
ForecastWidth2 2.758
(2.093)
Ln(MktCap) 0.851nnn 0.833nnn
(0.128) (0.104)
Std.return 3.208nnn 2.905nnn
(1.222) (1.112)
Leverage 0.293 0.241
(0.570) (0.467)
MtB 0.090n 0.080nn
(0.054) (0.039)
Cash/Assets 0.233 0.986
(0.773) (0.659)
R&D/Assets 1.999 3.026
(2.518) (2.230)
R&D missing 0.090 0.268
(0.335) (0.332)
Boardsize 0.063n 0.033
(0.035) (0.034)
Independent 0.096 0.026
(0.428) (0.350)
Return 0.120 0.190
(0.111) (0.149)
EBIT/Assets 8.198nnn 8.796nnn
(1.242) (1.061)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes
R2 0.503 0.493
N 4,022 5,685
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particular, forecast issuers are on average larger, have
lower leverage, a higher market-to-book ratio, and more
volatile stock returns. They also have lower capital expen-
ditures and a higher return on assets. Finally, firms that
issue EPS forecasts are followed by more analysts, more
likely to issue equity and debt in a given year, and have
higher institutional ownership.
Given these findings, I conduct two analyses in order to
alleviate the concern that the differences in firm charac-
teristics lead to biased estimates of the effect of CEO
optimism on CEO compensation. First, I show that con-
trolling for each firm's analyst following, earnings volati-
lity, and institutional ownership, as well as the decision to
issue equity or debt, does not change the results. Second,
I estimate a Heckman selection model whose results
corroborate my previous findings.
Table 7 presents the results from regressions that
include the variables #Analysts, Equity issue, Debt issue,
Earnings volatility, and Inst. ownership as additional con-
trols. The coefficient estimate on the optimism measure
HighForecast in the regression pertaining to the CEO's
option grants is 0.630 and significant at the 5% level
(column 1). For the CEO's bonus payments, the coefficient
estimate is 0.672 and significant at the 1% level
(column 3). For the CEO's total compensation, the estimate
is 0.169 and significant at the 10% level (column 5).
Regarding the amount of restricted stock that the CEO
receives and his salary, the coefficient estimates on High-
Forecast are negative, but not statistically significant.
Overall, the negative and significant coefficient esti-
mates on the optimism measure HighForecast in columns
1, 3, and 5 confirm the results of the previous analyses.
Controlling for known determinants of the decision to
issue an EPS forecast does not change the finding that
optimistic CEOs receive fewer incentives and lower total
compensation than their peers.
Table 6
Forecast issuers and non-issuers.
This table presents summary statistics for various firm characteristics. The sample period is 1996 to 2005. The unit of observation is a firm. For each firm,
each characteristic is averaged across all sample years. ForecastIssued is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm has issued at least one EPS
forecast during a given year. #Analysts is the number of analysts that provide EPS forecasts for the firm. Equity issue is a dummy variable indicating
whether or not the firm has issued equity during the year. Debt issue is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm has issued debt during the
year. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of each firm's income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets (computed over the prior five
years). Inst. ownership is the fraction of institutional owners among the firm's shareholders. All other variables are defined as in Table 4. Significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by nnn, nn, and n, respectively, for a two-tailed t-test of the null hypothesis of equal means against the alternative of
unequal means.
Firms issuing EPS forecasts Firms not issuing EPS forecasts
Mean Mean Difference
N (Std. dev.) N (Std. dev.) (Std. err.)
ForecastIssued 1,923 0.56 770 0.00 0.56nnn
(0.26) (0.00) (0.01)
MktCap 1,922 5,876 761 3,562 2,313nnn
(18,617) (11,942) (606)
Assets 1,923 9,710 767 8,519 1,191
(47,203) (32,015) (1,580)
Sales 1,923 3,950 767 2,428 1,521nnn
(10,682) (8,612) (395)
Leverage 1,921 0.19 767 0.21 0.02nnn
(0.15) (0.19) (0.01)
MtB 1,920 1.88 760 1.58 0.30nnn
(1.91) (1.93) (0.08)
Return 1,920 0.15 753 0.15 0.00
(0.32) (0.53) (0.02)
Std.return 1,918 0.14 749 0.12 0.02nnn
(0.07) (0.07) (0.003)
Cash/Assets 1,908 0.09 760 0.09 0.01
(0.10) (0.11) (0.005)
R&D/Assets 1,923 0.03 767 0.03 0.00
(0.06) (0.11) (0.004)
Capex/Assets 1,900 0.056 718 0.062 0.006n
(0.05) (0.08) (0.003)
EBIT/Assets 1,905 0.09 714 0.00 0.08nn
(0.10) (0.97) (0.04)
#Analysts 1,923 9.7 770 4.9 4.7nnn
(6.19) (5.86) (0.25)
Equity issue 1,923 0.42 770 0.28 0.14nnn
(0.49) (0.45) (0.02)
Debt issue 1,923 0.88 770 0.76 0.12nnn
(0.33) (0.43) (0.02)
Earnings volatility 1,922 0.07 765 0.15 0.08
(0.16) (2.20) (0.08)
Inst. ownership 1,702 0.62 615 0.51 0.11nnn
(0.18) (0.21) (0.01)
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Table 8 presents the results of a Heckman selection
model. The first column shows the first-stage probit
regression which models the selection into the sample.
CEO-firm combinations enter the sample if at least one EPS
forecast is released during the CEO's tenure. Thus, whether
or not a CEO-firm combination appears in the sample
during a given year depends on the determinants of the
decision to issue a forecast during all sample years. For
that reason, I model the selection indicator InSample for
each CEO-firm combination in the Execucomp database as
a function of the average values of #Analysts, Equity issue,
Debt issue, Earnings volatility, and Inst. ownership during
the CEO's tenure. In addition, I include the CEO and firm
characteristics that are used in the compensation regres-
sions as well as dummies for the different sample years.
The variables ForecastLead and ForecastWidth can only be
constructed if at least one EPS forecast is available. Thus,
they can only be included in the second-stage regressions,
but not in the first-stage. Finally, to avoid an incidental
parameters problem in the probit specification, I include
industry dummies based on the first three digits of each
firm's SIC code instead of dummies for each firm.
Columns 2 to 6 present the results of the second stages.
As in the previous compensation regressions, all specifica-
tions include the variables HighForecast, ForecastLead,
ForecastWidth, and ForecastWidth2, as well as CEO and
Table 7
Controlling for known determinants of the decision to issue EPS forecasts.
This table presents regression results after including known determinants of the decision to issue an EPS forecast as additional control variables. The
sample period is 1996 to 2005. All variables are defined as in Tables 4 and 6. Heterogeneity-robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the firm level
are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by nnn, nn, and n, respectively.
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
HighForecast 0.630nn 0.448 0.672nnn 0.098 0.169n
(0.267) (0.328) (0.258) (0.089) (0.087)
ForecastLead 0.003nn 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ForecastWidth 0.995 0.061 0.511 0.386 0.098
(1.549) (1.883) (1.594) (0.710) (0.569)
ForecastWidth2 1.274 0.379 0.586 0.398 0.060
(1.648) (1.979) (1.712) (0.655) (0.605)
Ln(MktCap) 0.572nnn 0.197n 0.898nnn 0.051nn 0.426nnn
(0.097) (0.101) (0.110) (0.022) (0.030)
Std.return 1.553 1.159 3.234nn 0.354 0.146
(1.473) (1.168) (1.278) (0.348) (0.356)
Leverage 0.346 0.837n 0.191 0.125 0.030
(0.461) (0.446) (0.432) (0.108) (0.109)
MtB 0.016 0.013 0.072nnn 0.002 0.001
(0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.005) (0.010)
Cash/Assets 0.566 0.746 1.344nn 0.096 0.217
(0.706) (0.607) (0.572) (0.118) (0.189)
R&D/Assets 0.872 2.022 2.954n 0.688 0.474
(1.500) (1.486) (1.561) (0.493) (0.561)
R&D missing 0.122 0.460 0.160 0.011 0.082
(0.386) (0.333) (0.286) (0.032) (0.075)
Boardsize 0.009 0.015 0.060nn 0.023nnn 0.010
(0.030) (0.039) (0.026) (0.007) (0.007)
Independent 0.011 0.415 0.116 0.162 0.099
(0.408) (0.411) (0.321) (0.106) (0.101)
Return 0.099 0.095nnn 0.258 0.003 0.049n
(0.065) (0.025) (0.181) (0.007) (0.027)
EBIT/Assets 0.511 0.012 8.388nnn 0.112 0.542nn
(0.731) (0.613) (0.814) (0.182) (0.264)
#Analysts 0.034nn 0.017 0.043nnn 0.002 0.000
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004)
Equity issue 0.104 0.261nn 0.187n 0.034 0.035
(0.140) (0.124) (0.105) (0.025) (0.034)
Debt issue 0.118 0.078 0.188nn 0.004 0.033
(0.093) (0.088) (0.076) (0.013) (0.025)
Earnings volatility 0.252 0.313 0.385 0.080 0.355nn
(0.510) (0.388) (0.545) (0.152) (0.179)
Inst. ownership 0.718 0.182 0.715n 0.075 0.097
(0.496) (0.472) (0.434) (0.113) (0.120)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.449 0.543 0.519 0.769 0.716
N 7,125 7,125 7,125 7,125 7,125
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firm characteristics and dummies for each year and each
firm. In addition, I include the variables Avg.#analysts, Avg.
earn.vol., Avg.equity issue, and Avg.debt issue. I assume
that the average institutional ownership during a CEO's
tenure satisfies the exclusion restriction. Thus, the variable
Avg.inst.own. is not included in the second-stage regres-
sions. Untabulated specifications, however, that include
Avg.inst.own. also in the second-stage lead to very similar
results. Finally, I include the inverse Mills' ratio obtained
from the first-stage probit model. The standard errors of
the coefficient estimates are clustered at the firm level, as
before.
Two main results can be obtained from the second-
stage regressions. First, the coefficient estimates on the
Table 8
Heckman selection model for the decision to issue an EPS forecast.
This table presents regression results from a Heckman selection model. The sample period is 1996 to 2005. The first column shows the results from the
first-stage probit specification. Columns 2 to 6 present the results from the second-stage regressions. All variables are defined as in Tables 4 and 6. Avg.
#analysts, Avg.equity issue, Avg.debt issue, Avg.earn.vol., and Avg.inst.own. denote the average values of the corresponding variables (computed across all
sample years for each CEO-firm combination). Inverse Mills' ratio is the inverse Mills' ratio (computed using the first-stage results). Industry dummies are
formed based on the first three digits of the firms' SIC codes. Heterogeneity-robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the firm level are reported in
parentheses in columns 2 to 6. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by nnn, nn, and n, respectively.
InSample Ln(Opt.þ1) Ln(Rst.st.þ1) Ln(Bon.þ1) Ln(Sal.þ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
HighForecast 0.604nn 0.475 0.755nnn 0.090 0.174nn
(0.268) (0.324) (0.253) (0.090) (0.086)
ForecastLead 0.003nn 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ForecastWidth 1.048 0.170 0.370 0.366 0.087
(1.593) (1.910) (1.601) (0.725) (0.575)
ForecastWidth2 1.379 0.261 0.305 0.390 0.030
(1.709) (2.072) (1.733) (0.686) (0.620)
Ln(MktCap) 0.112nnn 0.656nnn 0.161 0.876nnn 0.061nnn 0.436nnn
(0.021) (0.094) (0.098) (0.095) (0.022) (0.029)
Std.return 0.737n 1.524 1.153 2.976nn 0.329 0.065
(0.378) (1.424) (1.176) (1.294) (0.356) (0.351)
Leverage 0.046 0.524 0.594 0.255 0.124 0.012
(0.131) (0.447) (0.433) (0.418) (0.101) (0.107)
MtB 0.021nn 0.009 0.003 0.060nnn 0.001 0.003
(0.009) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.006) (0.011)
Cash/Assets 0.480nn 0.441 0.473 1.497nnn 0.087 0.222
(0.211) (0.705) (0.602) (0.573) (0.116) (0.191)
R&D/Assets 2.208nnn 0.408 2.808n 3.398nn 0.756n 0.534
(0.441) (1.586) (1.589) (1.621) (0.417) (0.556)
R&D missing 0.190nnn 0.107 0.449 0.205 0.010 0.078
(0.064) (0.387) (0.332) (0.286) (0.031) (0.076)
Boardsize 0.038nnn 0.011 0.023 0.068nn 0.021nnn 0.011
(0.008) (0.030) (0.039) (0.027) (0.007) (0.007)
Independent 0.533nnn 0.072 0.297 0.120 0.139 0.109
(0.115) (0.433) (0.443) (0.327) (0.109) (0.104)
Return 0.006 0.117 0.104nnn 0.279 0.004 0.050n
(0.024) (0.072) (0.024) (0.182) (0.006) (0.027)
EBIT/Assets 0.830nnn 0.511 0.049 8.480nnn 0.079 0.529n
(0.203) (0.762) (0.649) (0.821) (0.184) (0.273)
Avg.#analysts 0.073nnn 0.026 0.012 0.052n 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.030) (0.037) (0.030) (0.011) (0.010)
Avg.equity issue 0.315nnn 0.215 0.125 0.006 0.152 0.189
(0.118) (0.532) (0.576) (0.481) (0.190) (0.177)
Avg.debt issue 0.233nnn 0.123 0.850nnn 0.653nn 0.031 0.042
(0.063) (0.256) (0.326) (0.300) (0.080) (0.079)
Avg.earn.vol. 0.018 0.351 1.449nn 0.371 0.010 0.205
(0.249) (0.649) (0.729) (1.049) (0.277) (0.251)
Avg.inst.own. 0.658nnn
(0.122)
Inverse Mills' ratio 0.126 0.682 0.335 0.118 0.040
(0.632) (0.699) (0.575) (0.193) (0.183)
Industry dummies Yes No No No No No
Firm dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, tenure, age,
and gender dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 — 0.447 0.542 0.517 0.769 0.717
N 9,188 7,153 7,153 7,153 7,153 7,153
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optimism measure HighForecast are negative and signifi-
cant in the regressions pertaining to the CEO's option
grants (column 2), bonus payments (column 4), and total
compensation (column 6). Furthermore, the magnitudes of
the estimates are similar to the magnitudes presented in
Tables 4 and 7. If anything, the estimated effect of
optimism on the different compensation components is
slightly larger. Second, the estimated coefficients on the
inverse Mills' ratio are not statistically significant in any of
the regressions. Together, these findings confirm the pre-
vious results and suggest that the estimated effects of CEO
optimism on the various compensation variables do not
suffer from a serious sample selection bias driven by each
firm's decision on whether or not to provide EPS forecasts.
4.3. Earnings targets, EPS forecasts, and earnings
management
Regarding the evidence for a negative relation between
the fraction of EPS forecasts that exceed the EPS that are
eventually realized and the CEO's compensation, one may
be concerned that it is precisely because a forecast was not
met that the CEO receives lower pay as some form of
punishment. This explanation is consistent with a negative
effect of the CEO's optimism on his compensation if his
optimism leads the CEO to agree to performance targets
ex ante that prove to be too high ex post. However, the
same result may arise if the CEO's compensation in a given
year depends on whether or not the firm meets its own
earnings forecast, and all CEOs are unbiased and randomly
miss or meet their forecasts with equal probability. In such
a setting, in each year, some CEOs would miss their
forecasts and therefore receive lower pay—and ex post,
they would appear to be optimistic.
The fact that the variable HighForecast is not the
fraction of earnings forecasts that were too high during
the year under consideration, but a weighted average of
the fraction of exceedingly high forecasts across all years,
mitigates this concern. If the CEOs truly miss or meet their
EPS forecasts with equal probability, then the value of
HighForecast would tend towards 0.5 for all CEOs. While
the CEOs' compensation in each year would be negatively
related to the fraction of missed forecasts in that particular
year, it would be unrelated to the variable HighForecast,
which measures the average fraction of forecasts that
proved to be too high across all years. Nonetheless, the
nature of my data allows for several additional analyses.
4.3.1. Beating salient earnings benchmarks
One way to address the aforementioned concern that
some CEOs receive less compensation because the realized
earnings fall short of the firms' earnings targets is to
construct control variables that indicate whether or not
the firms' EPS exceed various EPS benchmarks. Two salient
benchmarks are the EPS that were realized during the
prior year and the analyst consensus forecast for the firm's
earnings (see, e.g., Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005;
Matsunaga and Park, 2001).
For each firm and fiscal period, I construct the analyst
consensus forecast as follows: First, I obtain all analyst
forecasts from the First Call Historical Database that were
issued during the sample period. As for the forecasts
issued by the firms, I then keep only analyst forecasts for
the common stock of each firm and drop observations if
the forecast date falls on or after the end of the fiscal
period for which the forecast was made or if either date is
missing. In case a broker issues multiple forecasts for the
same fiscal period—i.e., a broker updates his forecast—I
keep only the latest forecast. Furthermore, I drop observa-
tions if the broker ID that uniquely identifies each forecast
issuer is missing, and I keep only forecasts that were
issued at least 30 days before the end of the fiscal period
and require that at least three analyst forecasts are avail-
able. I apply a 30-day cut-off to ensure that a firm has
sufficient time before the end of the fiscal period to update
its own forecast in response to the analysts' forecasts. If a
firm chooses not to update its own forecast after observing
the analysts' forecasts, I interpret this behavior as a sign
that the firm is content with its original forecast. Finally,
I calculate the analyst consensus estimate as the median
analyst forecast for each firm and fiscal period combina-
tion. Defining the consensus as the equally weighted
average analyst forecast leads to very similar results.
Using the analyst consensus estimate and the EPS of
the prior year as benchmarks, I now construct two
variables to control for each firm's EPS performance in
the regressions. I first define dummy variables that take
the value one if the EPS in a given quarter exceed the EPS
that were realized during the same quarter of the prior
year. Similarly, I define dummy variables that take the
value one if the realized EPS in a given quarter exceed the
analyst consensus forecast for this quarter. For each firm
and in each year, I then compute the average of the
dummy variables that indicate whether or not the EPS
exceed the previous year's EPS as well as the average of the
dummy variables that indicate whether or not the EPS
exceed the analyst consensus forecast. I denote these
averages BeatLastYearEPS and BeatConsensusEstimate,
respectively.
Table 9 displays the results of regressions in which
BeatLastYearEPS and BeatConsensusEstimate have been
added as additional control variables. Panel A displays
the results using the optimism measure LongHolder, and
Panel B displays the results for the optimism measure
HighForecast. As before, the coefficient estimates on the
optimism measures in both panels are negative and sig-
nificant in the regressions pertaining to the CEOs' option
grants and bonus payments. Regarding the CEOs' total
compensation, the coefficient estimate on LongHolder
(Panel A) is negative and significant at the 10% level. The
coefficient estimate on HighForecast (Panel B) remains
negative but is no longer significant.
Overall, these results show that including the variables
BeatLastYearEPS and BeatConsensusEstimate to control for
whether or not a firm's realized earnings exceed salient
EPS benchmarks does not drive out the negative and
significant association between the measures of CEO
optimism and the CEOs' compensation. This finding sug-
gests that the lower pay of CEOs who systematically issue
optimistic EPS forecasts is not purely driven by negative
shocks to the firms' earnings that make the forecasts look
optimistic ex post and also lead to lower compensation.
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Table 9
Controlling for whether or not the realized EPS exceed salient benchmarks.
This table presents regression results after including BeatLastYearEPS and BeatConsensusEstimate as additional control variables. All other variables are
defined as in Table 4. The sample period is 1996 to 2005. Heterogeneity-robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the firm level are reported in
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by nnn, nn, and n, respectively.
Panel A
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
LongHolder 0.704nn 0.668 0.554nn 0.214 0.147n
(0.323) (0.498) (0.276) (0.139) (0.079)
Ln(MktCap) 0.638nnn 0.168 0.673nnn 0.073 0.427nnn
(0.103) (0.107) (0.103) (0.051) (0.029)
Std.return 0.370 0.097 2.812nnn 0.673 0.078
(1.208) (1.134) (1.031) (0.546) (0.341)
Leverage 0.879n 0.250 0.226 0.082 0.045
(0.524) (0.512) (0.471) (0.079) (0.125)
MtB 0.020 0.013 0.069nnn 0.001 0.007
(0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.011) (0.009)
Cash/Assets 0.178 0.252 0.156 0.169 0.267
(0.794) (0.713) (0.636) (0.184) (0.213)
R&D/Assets 0.258 2.067 2.165 0.469 0.087
(1.309) (1.388) (1.535) (0.378) (0.437)
R&D missing 0.239 0.242 0.657nn 0.186 0.052
(0.542) (0.405) (0.307) (0.134) (0.099)
Boardsize 0.010 0.028 0.053n 0.014 0.002
(0.034) (0.042) (0.028) (0.013) (0.008)
Independent 0.174 0.805 0.222 0.219n 0.060
(0.450) (0.512) (0.346) (0.120) (0.107)
Return 0.084 0.081nnn 0.111 0.005 0.047
(0.066) (0.026) (0.097) (0.008) (0.030)
EBIT/Assets 0.134 0.706 4.307nnn 0.336 0.180
(0.902) (0.701) (0.745) (0.232) (0.281)
BeatLast- 0.032 0.093 1.840nnn 0.019 0.127nnn
YearEPS (0.131) (0.125) (0.122) (0.037) (0.034)
BeatConsensus- 0.164 0.099 0.616nn 0.037 0.038
Estimate (0.132) (0.128) (0.119) (0.039) (0.035)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.476 0.579 0.584 0.667 0.762
N 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409
Panel B
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
HighForecast 0.494n 0.100 0.423nn 0.065 0.116
(0.263) (0.315) (0.213) (0.094) (0.075)
ForecastLead 0.002n 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ForecastWidth 0.819 0.401 1.002 0.377 0.228
(1.439) (1.977) (1.457) (0.885) (0.489)
ForecastWidth2 0.915 0.590 0.693 0.341 0.123
(1.599) (1.943) (1.614) (0.849) (0.527)
Ln(MktCap) 0.719nnn 0.068 0.583nnn 0.084nn 0.407nnn
(0.089) (0.089) (0.086) (0.034) (0.026)
Std.return 1.022 1.855 1.264 0.696 0.015
(1.337) (1.322) (1.355) (0.471) (0.372)
Leverage 0.681 0.978nn 0.071 0.049 0.005
(0.434) (0.435) (0.392) (0.111) (0.108)
MtB 0.004 0.019 0.063nnn 0.007 0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.007) (0.011)
Cash/Assets 0.619 0.417 0.656 0.195 0.212
(0.700) (0.628) (0.533) (0.129) (0.189)
R&D/Assets 0.470 2.798n 2.343 0.734 0.291
(1.603) (1.576) (1.440) (0.523) (0.590)
R&D missing 0.059 0.444 0.297 0.089 0.101
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4.3.2. Optimism measure based on analyst consensus
estimates
A second possibility to address the concern that some
CEOs receive less compensation because the realized earn-
ings fall short of the forecast earnings is to construct an
alternative optimism measure. The optimism measure
HighForecast is based on the comparison of the EPS
forecasts that were issued by a firm and the EPS that were
eventually realized. Alternatively, I can construct an opti-
mism measure by comparing the earnings that were
forecast by the firm with the corresponding analyst con-
sensus forecast. That is, when determining whether or not
a forecast issued by a firm was optimistic, instead of
examining if the forecast was higher or lower than the
ex post realized EPS, I examine whether or not the firm's
forecast was higher or lower than the median analyst
forecast. The merit of this procedure is that it identifies
those CEOs as optimistic who systematically issue fore-
casts that are higher than the corresponding analyst
consensus forecasts. Thus, the measure does not rely on
the ex post comparison of forecasts and realizations, but
rather upon the comparison of different forecasts that
were issued before the actual earnings were realized.21
To construct this measure, I first merge the analyst
consensus forecasts with the corresponding EPS forecasts
issued by each firm and assign a dummy that takes the
value one if the forecast issued by the firm exceeds the
analyst consensus forecast. As for the optimism measure
HighForecast, if the firm's forecast was an EPS range,
I compare the lower bound of that range with the analyst
consensus forecast. If the firm's forecast was a point
estimate, I compare the point estimate with the analyst
consensus forecast. Unreported analyses reveal that the
average difference between the midpoints of forecasts
issued by the firms and the ex post realized EPS is larger
than the average difference between the analyst consensus
forecasts and the ex post realized EPS. This suggests that
EPS forecasts that exceed the analyst consensus forecast
are not simply the result of positive inside information
which is available to the CEO but not to the analysts.
In the second step, for each firm and for each year, I
average the dummies indicating whether a forecast issued
by the firm exceeds the analyst consensus forecast across
all consensus and firm forecast pairs. For each firm-year
combination, this procedure results in the fraction of EPS
forecasts issued by the firm that were higher than the
corresponding analyst consensus forecast. Finally, for each
CEO-firm combination, I calculate the equally weighted
average of these fractions across all years. The resulting
variable, denoted ExceedConsensus, can take on values
between zero and one. ExceedConsensus is equal to zero if
all company-issued forecasts were lower than the corre-
sponding analyst consensus forecast. It is equal to one if all
forecasts issued by the firm exceed the corresponding analyst
consensus forecast. Thus, higher values of the variable
ExceedConsensus are indicative of more optimistic beliefs.
Table 10 displays the results of regressions in which the
variable HighForecast has been replaced by the variable
ExceedConsensus. The first column reveals a negative and
significant coefficient estimate on the optimism measure
ExceedConsensus in the regression regarding the CEO's
option grants. Similar to the results presented in Table 9,
this finding suggests that the smaller option grants that
optimistic CEOs receive are not simply driven by unex-
pected, negative shocks to a firm's earnings that cause the
realized EPS to fall short of the forecast EPS. Unlike in
Table 9, however, the coefficient estimates in the remain-
ing columns are not statistically significant.
Table 9 (continued )
Panel B
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
(0.365) (0.371) (0.255) (0.072) (0.076)
Boardsize 0.005 0.034 0.044 0.027n 0.011
(0.028) (0.035) (0.027) (0.014) (0.007)
Independent 0.246 0.487 0.003 0.245nn 0.070
(0.388) (0.415) (0.288) (0.112) (0.096)
Return 0.102 0.127nnn 0.187 0.008 0.052n
(0.064) (0.029) (0.131) (0.008) (0.029)
EBIT/Assets 0.327 0.268 4.874nnn 0.025 0.316
(0.757) (0.630) (0.716) (0.199) (0.258)
BeatLast- 0.004 0.131 1.899nnn 0.032 0.109nnn
YearEPS (0.111) (0.110) (0.107) (0.027) (0.027)
BeatConsensus- 0.159 0.122 0.738nnn 0.028 0.053n
Estimate (0.114) (0.108) (0.100) (0.024) (0.029)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.445 0.537 0.570 0.726 0.720
N 7,913 7,913 7,913 7,913 7,913
21 The correlation coefficient between HighForecast and the new
measure, ExceedConsensus, is 0.77 and significant at the 1% level.
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4.3.3. Earnings management
Related to the concern that the lower compensation of
some CEOs is the result of missing a given earnings target
is the concern that some CEOs may manage their firms'
earnings in order to meet previously announced forecasts.
One may thus be concerned that the variable HighForecast
reflects differences in earnings management rather than
optimism: CEOs who successfully manage their earnings to
meet or beat their own EPS forecasts would appear to be
less optimistic, and CEOs who are not able to manage their
earnings sufficiently upwards would appear to be more
optimistic. This concern is mitigated to the extent that the
firm fixed effects and time-varying control variables in the
compensation regressions capture a firm's ability to
manipulate its earnings. Moreover, this concern does not
apply to the optimism measure ExceedConsensus. Exceed-
Consensus is based on a comparison between the EPS
forecasts provided by the firms and the corresponding
analyst consensus forecasts—neither of which is affected
by any subsequent earnings management. The negative
and significant coefficient estimate for the optimism
measure ExceedConsensus in the regression pertaining to
the CEOs' option grants presented in Table 10 thus sug-
gests that the results are not merely driven by differences
in the firms' abilities to manage their earnings.
4.4. CEO pessimism
The evidence that optimistic CEOs appear to receive
less compensation than their peers naturally leads to the
following question: What about pessimistic CEOs? Should
we expect that pessimists receive higher compensation
than their peers, or are biased beliefs in either direction
associated with lower pay? In fact, one may be concerned
that biased beliefs in general are a sign of lower talent and
may therefore lead to lower compensation.
To address this concern, I define a new dummy vari-
able, Pessimist, that takes the value one for the 25% “most
Table 10
Optimism measure based on the comparison with analyst consensus estimates.
This table presents the results for regressions using the optimism measure ExceedConsensus, which is based on the difference between the firm's EPS
forecasts and the corresponding analyst consensus forecasts. All other variables are defined as in Table 4. The sample period is 1996 to 2005.
Heterogeneity-robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is
denoted by nnn, nn, and n, respectively.
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
Exceed- 0.466n 0.245 0.233 0.025 0.003
Consensus (0.244) (0.330) (0.240) (0.087) (0.077)
ForecastLead 0.002nn 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ForecastWidth 0.294 0.599 0.915 0.294 0.329
(1.578) (2.248) (1.702) (1.019) (0.597)
ForecastWidth2 0.332 1.443 0.740 0.336 0.152
(1.693) (2.301) (1.763) (0.971) (0.641)
Ln(MktCap) 0.683nnn 0.127 0.882nnn 0.085nnn 0.421nnn
(0.089) (0.090) (0.097) (0.032) (0.027)
Std.return 2.638 2.585 2.077 1.104nn 0.045
(1.890) (1.907) (2.041) (0.549) (0.591)
Leverage 0.666 0.980nn 0.256 0.027 0.021
(0.443) (0.439) (0.419) (0.112) (0.107)
MtB 0.001 0.006 0.064nnn 0.008 0.001
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.007) (0.010)
Cash/Assets 0.749 0.285 1.690nnn 0.161 0.304
(0.715) (0.631) (0.568) (0.129) (0.194)
R&D/Assets 0.202 2.093 4.007nn 0.689 0.460
(1.591) (1.533) (1.661) (0.530) (0.587)
R&D missing 0.044 0.528 0.178 0.091 0.119
(0.362) (0.358) (0.272) (0.072) (0.075)
Boardsize 0.011 0.026 0.074nnn 0.027n 0.012n
(0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.014) (0.007)
Independent 0.183 0.314 0.144 0.220n 0.042
(0.398) (0.423) (0.318) (0.113) (0.098)
Return 0.104 0.125nnn 0.285 0.006 0.044n
(0.067) (0.029) (0.187) (0.007) (0.025)
EBIT/Assets 0.676 0.263 8.305nnn 0.062 0.619nn
(0.729) (0.603) (0.802) (0.190) (0.255)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.439 0.534 0.503 0.711 0.706
N 7,584 7,584 7,584 7,584 7,584
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pessimistic” CEOs in my sample. First, for each CEO-firm
combination, I compute the fraction of forecasts that were
pessimistic22: If a forecast was issued in the form of an EPS
range, I consider it pessimistic if the upper bound of the
range is lower than the EPS that were eventually realized.
If a forecast was a point estimate, I consider it pessimistic
if this point estimate is lower than the ex post realized EPS.
I then compute the 75th percentile of the distribution of
the fraction of pessimistic forecasts across all CEO-firm
combinations in my sample. Finally, I assign the dummy
variable Pessimist as follows. Pessimist takes the value one
if the fraction of pessimistic forecasts that the CEO has
made is larger than the 75th percentile of the distribution
across all CEO-firm combinations. Pessimist thus desig-
nates the 25% “most pessimistic” CEOs in the sample.
I now re-estimate the regressions reported in
Section 3.2, replacing the variable HighForecast with
the dummy variable Pessimist. Table 11 displays the
results. The coefficient estimates on Pessimist provide
empirical evidence that biased beliefs are not generally
associated with lower compensation. To the contrary,
the coefficient estimates on Pessimist are positive and
significant in the regressions regarding the CEO's option
grants, restricted stock grants, and bonus payments. The
coefficient estimates in the regressions for the CEO's
salary and total compensation are positive, but not
statistically significant. Thus, CEOs with downward
biased beliefs, i.e., pessimistic CEOs, receive higher incen-
tive compensation than their peers. This finding is con-
sistent with pessimists underestimating the value of their
incentive claims, so that more claims must be granted to
meet the CEO's participation and incentive compatibility
constraints. The results are at odds with an alternative
explanation in which biases per se, i.e., both optimism
and pessimism, are a sign of lower talent which, in turn,
leads to lower compensation.
Table 11
CEO pessimism.
This table presents regression results for pessimistic CEOs. The sample period is 1996 to 2005. Pessimist is a dummy variable for the 25% most pessimistic
CEOs in the sample. All other variables are defined as in Table 4. Heterogeneity-robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the firm level are
reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by nnn, nn, and n, respectively.
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
Pessimist 0.527nnn 0.356n 0.332nn 0.025 0.080
(0.186) (0.194) (0.156) (0.070) (0.054)
ForecastLead 0.002n 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ForecastWidth 0.820 0.153 0.669 0.296 0.121
(1.391) (1.955) (1.502) (0.859) (0.517)
ForecastWidth2 0.877 0.862 0.820 0.312 0.061
(1.493) (2.003) (1.627) (0.821) (0.561)
Ln(MktCap) 0.696nnn 0.117 0.866nnn 0.092nnn 0.429nnn
(0.086) (0.085) (0.092) (0.031) (0.026)
Std.return 1.574 1.534 3.002nn 0.612 0.096
(1.387) (1.268) (1.282) (0.421) (0.350)
Leverage 0.599 0.953nn 0.203 0.052 0.001
(0.422) (0.417) (0.401) (0.105) (0.103)
MtB 0.001 0.007 0.067nnn 0.009 0.001
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.006) (0.010)
Cash/Assets 0.584 0.274 1.476nnn 0.167 0.246
(0.667) (0.598) (0.550) (0.120) (0.182)
R&D/Assets 0.279 2.482n 3.317nn 0.662 0.380
(1.449) (1.472) (1.536) (0.467) (0.535)
R&D missing 0.031 0.558 0.122 0.087 0.119
(0.344) (0.365) (0.262) (0.069) (0.074)
Boardsize 0.017 0.022 0.062nn 0.026n 0.010
(0.027) (0.035) (0.028) (0.013) (0.006)
Independent 0.134 0.308 0.083 0.220nn 0.076
(0.378) (0.402) (0.301) (0.106) (0.094)
Return 0.114n 0.122nnn 0.297 0.009 0.048n
(0.068) (0.028) (0.186) (0.008) (0.026)
EBIT/Assets 0.345 0.405 8.585nnn 0.051 0.601nn
(0.678) (0.574) (0.769) (0.174) (0.238)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.447 0.534 0.518 0.732 0.723
N 8,238 8,238 8,238 8,238 8,238
22 As for the optimism measure HighForecast, I first compute the
average for each year and then the equally weighted average across
all years.
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Table 12
Controlling for the CEO's portfolio of company stock and options.
This table presents regression results after including the natural logarithm of the total value (in $0000) of the CEO's portfolio of company stock and
options at the beginning of the fiscal year, Ln(CEO invest.), as an additional control variable. All other variables are defined as in Table 4. The sample period
is 1996 to 2005. Heterogeneity-robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level is denoted by nnn, nn, and n, respectively.
Panel A
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
LongHolder 0.768nn 0.624 0.767nnn 0.182 0.186nn
(0.331) (0.472) (0.266) (0.117) (0.082)
Ln(MktCap) 0.519nnn 0.269nn 1.125nnn 0.090n 0.402nnn
(0.107) (0.107) (0.118) (0.048) (0.029)
Std.return 0.335 0.220 4.158nnn 0.555 0.196
(1.166) (1.183) (0.956) (0.443) (0.337)
Leverage 0.400 0.387 0.185 0.056 0.064
(0.521) (0.485) (0.490) (0.067) (0.121)
MtB 0.017 0.002 0.080nnn 0.008 0.009
(0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.008) (0.009)
Cash/Assets 0.139 0.578 0.865 0.125 0.249
(0.772) (0.703) (0.674) (0.174) (0.206)
R&D/Assets 0.087 2.534n 4.355nn 0.156 0.155
(1.211) (1.432) (1.922) (0.218) (0.412)
R&D missing 0.388 0.247 0.350 0.075 0.008
(0.537) (0.393) (0.341) (0.054) (0.090)
Boardsize 0.029 0.028 0.067nn 0.017 0.001
(0.035) (0.042) (0.029) (0.012) (0.008)
Independent 0.131 0.715 0.067 0.215n 0.071
(0.439) (0.491) (0.378) (0.112) (0.105)
Return 0.038 0.047 0.132 0.014 0.023
(0.047) (0.037) (0.119) (0.013) (0.018)
EBIT/Assets 0.066 0.894 7.392nnn 0.238 0.521nn
(0.869) (0.659) (0.900) (0.185) (0.254)
Ln(CEO invest.) 0.137nn 0.055 0.196nnn 0.029 0.057nnn
(0.056) (0.056) (0.064) (0.020) (0.015)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.489 0.587 0.540 0.694 0.774
N 5,514 5,514 5,514 5,514 5,514
Panel B
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
HighForecast 0.502n 0.128 0.624nnn 0.033 0.126n
(0.287) (0.328) (0.230) (0.088) (0.073)
ForecastLead 0.002n 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
ForecastWidth 0.470 0.406 0.869 0.781 0.011
(1.591) (2.000) (1.504) (0.825) (0.476)
ForecastWidth2 0.810 1.585 0.940 0.755 0.086
(1.741) (1.922) (1.653) (0.783) (0.486)
Ln(MktCap) 0.607nnn 0.150 1.069nnn 0.110nnn 0.400nnn
(0.101) (0.094) (0.110) (0.034) (0.029)
Std.return 1.492 1.674 2.904nn 0.602 0.032
(1.441) (1.288) (1.296) (0.401) (0.363)
Leverage 0.412 0.917nn 0.292 0.048 0.056
(0.437) (0.427) (0.415) (0.088) (0.107)
MtB 0.009 0.006 0.071nnn 0.011n 0.004
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.007) (0.011)
Cash/Assets 0.627 0.237 1.381nn 0.192 0.238
(0.697) (0.625) (0.577) (0.130) (0.190)
R&D/Assets 0.371 1.839 3.931nn 0.569 0.328
(1.515) (1.467) (1.611) (0.457) (0.549)
R&D missing 0.058 0.702n 0.098 0.056 0.126n
(0.375) (0.379) (0.286) (0.037) (0.075)
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4.5. Portfolio diversification and risk-tolerance
A further concern one may have is that the estimation
results are driven by differences in risk-aversion or port-
folio diversification. Some CEOs may be more risk-tolerant
than others and therefore hold on to their in-the-money
options longer, or they may have invested less of their
personal wealth in the firm and therefore benefit less from
exercising their options early and diversifying. Finally,
some CEOs may use hedging instruments such as zero-
cost collars, equity swaps, or forward contracts to reduce
their exposure to firm-specific risk.
These concerns are particularly hard to tackle because
I have little means to directly assess a given CEO's risk-
aversion, nor do I observe the CEO's entire wealth portfo-
lio. However, in unreported conditional logit models with
firm fixed effects, I do not find any evidence that the total
value of the CEO's portfolio of company stocks and options
explains his exercise behavior. This result is consistent
with the findings of Sautner and Weber (2009), who use
survey data to assess the relation between individual
characteristics and option exercise decisions and find
no evidence that differences in diversification or risk-
aversion can explain the observed differences in exercise
behavior.
Furthermore, including the natural logarithm of the
total value (in $0000) of the CEO's portfolio of company
stock and options at the beginning of the fiscal year as an
additional control variable in the compensation regres-
sions has no material effect on the estimation results.23
Table 12 presents the results of these regressions. The
coefficient estimates for both optimism measures
LongHolder (Panel A) and HighForecast (Panel B) remain
negative and statistically significant in the regressions
pertaining to the CEO's option grants, bonus payments,
and total compensation. In fact, even the magnitudes of
the point estimates remain similar after adding the addi-
tional control variable.
Regarding the use of hedging instruments, Gao (2010)
provides evidence that CEOs who face lower hedging costs
receive higher-powered incentive contracts. Thus, if hold-
ing on longer to exercisable in-the-money options were
driven entirely by the better hedging opportunities faced
by some CEOs, one would expect a positive association
between the optimism measure LongHolder and the CEOs'
incentive compensation. I, however, document a negative
association. Moreover, according to the firms' SEC filings,
such hedging transactions are very rare (see, e.g., Bettis,
Bizjak, and Lemmon, 2001; Gao, 2010).
Finally, to further examine whether or not the CEOs whom
I classify as optimistic are simply more risk-tolerant than their
peers, I examine the relation between the utilized measures of
optimism and the percentage of incentive pay in the CEOs'
total compensation. To do so, I regress the sum of the CEO's
bonus payments and restricted stock and option grants
divided by his total compensation on the same set of
explanatory variables as before. The results are presented in
Table 13. The coefficient estimates on the optimism measure
LongHolder are negative and statistically significant at the 10%
level in both columns 1 and 2. The coefficient estimate for
HighForecast is negative and significant at the 5% level in
column 3. The coefficient estimate in column 4 is negative, but
not statistically significant. These results imply a negative
relation between the measures of CEO optimism and the
percentage of incentives in the CEOs' total compensation.
Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013), however, provide evidence
that CEOs who are more risk-tolerant are more likely to
receive proportionally larger compensation in the form of
stocks, options, and bonus payments. Similarly, Grund and
Sliwka (2010) find that an employee's risk-tolerance has a
positive and substantial impact on the likelihood of receiving
Table 12 (continued )
Panel B
Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1)
Boardsize 0.026 0.018 0.076nnn 0.025n 0.005
(0.029) (0.036) (0.027) (0.013) (0.007)
Independent 0.219 0.331 0.131 0.231nn 0.026
(0.404) (0.414) (0.314) (0.097) (0.103)
Return 0.073 0.087nnn 0.207 0.020 0.040
(0.057) (0.027) (0.156) (0.014) (0.027)
EBIT/Assets 0.463 0.761 9.370nnn 0.092 0.779nnn
(0.734) (0.600) (0.836) (0.150) (0.243)
Ln(CEO invest.) 0.092n 0.049 0.250nnn 0.031nn 0.017
(0.049) (0.045) (0.059) (0.014) (0.024)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.456 0.546 0.533 0.754 0.733
N 7,754 7,754 7,754 7,754 7,754
23 The total value of a CEO's investment is calculated as the total
value of all unvested and vested stock options and all restricted and
unrestricted shares that the CEO owns. The median total investment in
the sample is $14 million, and the mean is $85 million. Unreported
regressions in which the total value of the CEO's investment is scaled by
the firm's market capitalization yield similar results.
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performance-contingent wages. Thus, the empirical findings
in this and other papers suggest that differences in risk-
tolerance alone do not explain the results.24
5. Conclusion
The psychology literature documents a widespread
tendency in all humans to be overly optimistic regarding
their abilities and their future. Moreover, a growing
literature in economics and finance provides evidence that
these biases extend to firms' senior executives and CEOs
and have an economically significant effect on corporate
decisions, actions, and outcomes. Whether or not firms
purposefully choose to hire and promote such managers,
their biases have implications for the design of organiza-
tional structures, compensation and incentive schemes,
governance mechanisms, and regulation. Taking the exis-
tence of optimistic CEOs as given, this paper has focused
on how their optimism affects their compensation.
Using data on compensation in US firms, I have shown that
CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts
are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option
grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation
than their peers. This new empirical evidence suggests that
corporate boards take a CEO's optimism regarding the future
prospects of the firm into account when setting the CEO's
compensation. These findings do not imply, however, that all
firms should hire optimistic CEOs. While optimists may be
“cheaper,” they may also have potentially costly effects on
corporate policies, as has been documented by several
authors. The precise nature of the trade-off between the costs
and benefits of hiring an optimistic manager is beyond the
scope of this paper and remains an important topic for future
research.
Appendix A. Framework for the effect of optimism
on compensation
A.1. Setup
This appendix introduces a model that is used as a
framework to study the effect of an agent's optimism on the
optimal compensation contract. Fig. 1 depicts an overview.
I consider a principal that employs an agent to implement and
thereafter work on a two-period project. The principal is risk-
neutral with utility function VðπÞ ¼ π, where π denotes the
principal's final net payoff. The agent is risk-averse with utility
function Uðw; cÞ ¼ uðwÞc, where w denotes the agent's total
wealth at the end of the second period, and c denotes the
agent's total effort costs. I assume that uðwÞ satisfies u0ðwÞ40,
limw-0u0ðwÞ ¼1, u″ðwÞo0, and u″ðwÞ=u0ðwÞ ¼ γ=w40,
i.e., uðwÞ satisfies constant relative risk-aversion. Furthermore,
I assume that the agent has zero wealth at the beginning of
the first period and access to some alternative employment
offer that provides utility Ωt at time t if accepted. The discount
rate is normalized to zero.
The agent's task is to implement the project at time
t¼1 and later on, at time t¼2, to improve the project if
this is feasible. Implementing and improving the project
costs the agent private costs c140 and c240, respectively,
but there are no direct costs to the firm. The objective
probability that the project is successful is pAð0;1Þ if it is
not improved and pþΔ, with ΔA ð0;1pÞ, if the agent
improves the project. ex ante, improvement is possible
with probability δAð0;1Þ. The agent believes the
Table 13
Effect of optimism on the fraction of incentives in the CEO's total
compensation.
This table presents regression results regarding the fraction of incen-
tive pay in the CEO's total compensation. Incentive/Total is the sum of
Bonus, Restricted stock, and Options divided by Total compensation. All
other variables are defined as in Tables 4 and 12. The sample period is
1996 to 2005. Heterogeneity-robust standard errors that allow for
clustering at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by nnn, nn, and n, respectively.
Incentive/
Total
Incentive/
Total
Incentive/
Total
Incentive/
Total
LongHolder 0.056n 0.056n
(0.029) (0.029)
HighForecast 0.035nn 0.030
(0.018) (0.018)
ForecastLead 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ForecastWidth 0.063 0.017
(0.115) (0.123)
ForecastWidth2 0.045 (0.007)
(0.116) (0.126)
Ln(MktCap) 0.071nnn 0.067nnn 0.073nnn 0.071nnn
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Std.return 0.127 0.119 0.124 0.144
(0.101) (0.102) (0.094) (0.094)
Leverage 0.023 0.011 0.007 0.012
(0.037) (0.038) (0.032) (0.033)
MtB 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Cash/Assets 0.003 0.002 0.093n 0.094n
(0.052) (0.053) (0.048) (0.049)
R&D/Assets 0.105 0.115 0.014 0.001
(0.100) (0.098) (0.126) (0.127)
R&D missing 0.008 0.002 0.033 0.037
(0.026) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023)
Boardsize 0.002 0.003 0.004nn 0.003n
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Independent 0.003 0.004 0.018 0.015
(0.030) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028)
Return 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
EBIT/Assets 0.193nnn 0.195nnn 0.269nnn 0.293nnn
(0.070) (0.075) (0.059) (0.064)
Ln(CEO invest.) 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.003)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.577 0.587 0.544 0.554
N 5,777 5,514 8,238 7,754
24 Additional evidence that the late exercising of in-the-money
options captures optimism rather than risk-tolerance is provided, for
example, by Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2008), Malmendier, Tate, and
Yan (2011), and Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley
(2011). Further evidence on the positive association between risk-
tolerance and incentive pay is provided by Bellemare and Shearer
(2010) and Dohmen and Falk (2011).
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probability of success to be bpA ½p;1ΔÞ if it has not been
improved and bpþΔ if it has been improved. Thus, the
agent can be either unbiased ðbp ¼ pÞ or optimistic
ðpobpo1ΔÞ.25 However, I will assume that an agent's
optimism is not so extreme as to entirely undo the effects
of his risk-aversion in the second period.26 The principal is
assumed to have unbiased beliefs. Furthermore, I assume
that the principal knows the agent's beliefs, and that the
timing of the decisions and events, as well as the different
model parameters, are common knowledge.
In case of success, the project has payoff R40 at the end
of the second period. The payoff is zero if the project fails. By
assumption, the payoff in case of success is “large enough” so
that it is always optimal for the principal to induce the agent
to implement and improve the project. In order to compen-
sate the agent, the principal can promise payments to the
agent that are contingent on the project's final payoff—the
only verifiable information. Note that in this setting, the
optimal contract can be expressed as a fixed salary that is
independent of the project's outcome and an additional
incentive payment, which is contingent on the project's
success.27 Furthermore, I assume that after implementing
the project, but before it becomes known whether or not
the project can be improved, the agent can sell a fraction
αA ½0;1 of the incentive claim he received in the first period
to a risk-neutral, competitive outside investor with unbiased
beliefs. The agent cannot commit not to sell, but both
implementing the project and selling the incentive claim are
Fig. 1. Model overview. This figure shows an overview of the model described in Appendix A. The sequence of events is as follows. Just before t¼1, the
agent receives his compensation claims. At t¼1, the agent chooses whether to implement the project. Thereafter, he can sell a fraction of his incentive
claims. Just before t¼2, the principal can re-supply the agent with compensation claims. At t¼2, the agent chooses whether to improve the project if this is
feasible. Improvement is feasible with probability δ. At the end of the second period, the project's final payoff—either R or zero—is realized, and all
compensation claims are paid. The project succeeds with probability pþΔ (p) if it has (not) been improved.
t = 1 t = 2
Agent is
granted
original
compensa-
tion
claims
Agent
decides
whether or
not to
implement
the project
(observ-
able)
Agent
decides
what
fraction of
his
incentive
claim to
sell (ob-
servable)
Whether or
not the
project can
be
improved
becomes
common
knowledge
Principal
can
re-supply
the agent
with com-
pensation
claims
Agent
decides
whether or
not to
improve
the project
(if feasible)
Project
pays off R
if
successful
and 0
otherwise
(verifiable)
Fig. 2. Timing of events and decisions. This figure shows the timing of the events and decisions in the model described in Appendix A.
25 In this setup, an optimistic agent thus overestimates the expected
benefits of implementing the project and will therefore be more willing
to exert effort. This is consistent with the results of Bénabou and Tirole
(2002), who show how higher confidence can improve an agent's
motivation to undertake projects, and with the findings of Puri and
Robinson (2007), who show that optimistic people (except for extreme
optimists) work harder.
26 See the derivation of the optimal contract for a formal statement
of this assumption. Appendix B examines the optimal contract in case
this assumption is violated.
27 A generic contract in the two-outcome setting specifies two
payments ωðRÞ and ωð0Þ. Without loss of generality, we can express this
contract as a fixed payment s¼ωð0Þ that is independent of the project's
outcome and an incentive claim that pays b¼ωðRÞωð0Þ in case the
project succeeds.
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observable. These assumptions allow me to study the effect of
optimism on the agent's decision to retain his incentive claims
and further generate implications on how optimists can be
identified empirically. Finally, I assume that the principal has
all the bargaining power.
In sum, the sequence of events and decisions is as
follows: Just before t¼1, the principal offers the agent an
unconditional salary s1 and an incentive claim with payoff
b1 in case the project succeeds. The agent can either accept
or decline the proposed contract. At t¼1, if the agent has
accepted the contract, he can either implement the project
at a private cost c1 or not. After implementation, the agent
can sell a fraction αA ½0;1 of his incentive claim to an
outside investor. Just before t¼2—after observing the
agent's implementation and selling decisions and knowing
whether or not the project can be improved—the principal
can offer the agent an additional fixed payment of s2 and
an additional incentive claim with payoff b2, conditional
on the project's success. Thereafter, at t¼2, the agent
chooses whether or not to improve the project at private
cost c2 in case improvement is feasible. Finally, at the end
of the second period, the project's final payoff is realized,
and all compensation claims are paid. This sequence of
events and decisions is depicted on a time-line in Fig. 2.
A.2. Derivation of the optimal contract by backward
induction
A.2.1. Period 2: subgame in which the project can be
improved
Let αA ½0;1 denote the fraction of the agent's original
incentive claim that he has sold to an outside investor, and
let θ denote the price that the agent received per unit of
his claim. The agent's incentive compatibility constraint at
t¼2 can then be written as
ðbpþΔÞu½αθþs1þs2þð1αÞb1þb2
þð1bpΔÞu½αθþs1þs2c1c2 Z bp  u½αθþs1þs2þð1αÞb1þb2þð1bpÞu½αθþs1þs2c1;
ð3Þ
and the agent's participation constraint is
ðbpþΔÞu½αθþs1þs2þð1αÞb1þb2
þð1bpΔÞu½αθþs1þs2c1c2 Z bp  u½αθþs1þð1αÞb1þð1bpÞu½αθþs1þΩ2c1:
ð4Þ
The agent's participation constraint will be binding
when evaluated at the optimal contract because the
principal is assumed to have all the bargaining power.
Furthermore, it follows from the first-order conditions of
the principal's profit maximization problem that the
agent's incentive compatibility constraint will be binding
at the optimum as long as the following assumption holds:
Assumption 1. An agent's optimism does not entirely undo
the effects of his risk-aversion at t¼2, i.e.,
u0½αnθþsn1þsn2þð1αnÞbn1þbn2
u0½αnθþsn1þsn2
oðpþΔÞð1bpΔÞðbpþΔÞð1pΔÞ: ð5Þ
Thus, under Assumption 1, we obtain for sn2 and b
n
2
sn2 ¼ u1 bp  u αθþs1þ 1αð Þb1 þ 1bp   u αθþs1½ 
þΩ2bpc2Δoaθs1 ð6Þ
and
bn2 ¼ u1 bp  u αθþs1þ 1αð Þb1 þ 1bp   u αθþs1½ 
þΩ2þ 1bp c2Δou1 bp  u αθþs1þ 1αð Þb1 
þ 1bp   u αθþs1½ þΩ2bpc2Δo 1αð Þb1: ð7Þ
Furthermore, the agent's expected utility in case the
project can be improved is
U1  bp  u½αθþs1þð1αÞb1þð1bpÞ  u½αθþs1
þΩ2c1: ð8Þ
A.2.2. Period 2: subgame in which the project cannot be
improved
If the project cannot be improved, there is no need for
the principal to offer any new compensation claims to the
agent, i.e., sn2 ¼ bn2 ¼ 0. In that case, the agent's expected
utility is
U0  bp  u½αθþs1þð1αÞb1þð1bpÞ  u½αθþs1
þΩ2c1: ð9Þ
A.2.3. The agent's choice of α
After the agent has implemented the project, he max-
imizes his expected utility by choosing the fraction α of his
original incentive claim that he sells to the outside
investor:
Un  max
αA ½0;1
fδ  U1þð1δÞ  U0g ð10Þ
¼ max
αA ½0;1
fbp  u½αθþs1þð1αÞb1þð1bpÞ  u½αθþs1
þΩ2c1g; ð11Þ
with first-order condition28bp  u0½αnθþs1þð1αnÞb1  ðθb1Þ
þð1bpÞ  u0½αnθþs1  θ¼ 0: ð12Þ
Risk-neutral, competitive outside investors with unbiased
beliefs will offer a price
θ¼ ðpþδΔÞb1; ð13Þ
so for b140, the first-order condition implies
u0½αnθþs1
u0½αnθþs1þð1αnÞb1
¼ bp  ð1pδΔÞð1bpÞ  ðpþδΔÞ: ð14Þ
Denoting the left-hand-side of this equation by gðαnÞ and
the right-hand-side by hðbpÞ, we have
∂gðαnÞ
∂αn
¼ u″½α
nθþs1  u0½αnθþs1þð1αnÞb1  θ
ðu0½αnθþs1þð1αnÞb1Þ2
þu″½α
nθþs1þð1αnÞb1  ðb1θÞ  u0½αnθþs1
ðu0½αnθþs1þð1αnÞb1Þ2
o0 ð15Þ
g  g 0ð Þ ¼ u
0ðs1Þ
u0ðs1þb1Þ
41 ð16Þ
28 Note that the second-order condition for a maximum, bp 
u″½αnθþs1 þð1αnÞb1  ðθb1Þ2þð1bpÞ  u″½αnθþs1 θ2o0, is satisfied
as well because uðwÞ is assumed to be concave.
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g  g 1ð Þ ¼ u
0ðθþs1Þ
u0ðθþs1Þ
¼ 1: ð17Þ
For hðbpÞ we obtain
∂hðbpÞ
∂bp ¼ 1ð1bpÞ2  1pδΔpþδΔ 40 ð18Þ
and
hðpþδΔÞ ¼ 1: ð19Þ
Thus, we obtain αn ¼ 1 for bprpþδΔ and αno1 forbp4pþδΔ. The optimal claims granted to the agent in case
the project can be improved in the second period can now
be expressed as
sn2 ¼ u1 Unþc1bpc2Δn oαnθs1 ð20Þ
and
bn2 ¼ u1 Unþc1þ 1bp c2Δn ou1 Unþc1bpc2Δn o 1αn b1:
ð21Þ
A.2.4. Period 1
Just before the first period, the principal can offer the agent
a fixed salary s1 and an incentive claim that pays out b1 in case
the project succeeds. Because the agent can sell this incentive
claim to an outside investor after the project has been
implemented, he can turn the incentive claim into a safe
payment. Thus, there is no benefit from insuring the agent
with a fixed salary, as any fixed payment can be equally
provided to the agent by increasing his incentive claim by an
amount that will fetch a price equal to the fixed payment
when sold to the outside investor. From here on, I will
therefore assume that the principal sets sn1 ¼ 0.29 Thus, the
agent's expected utility from implementing the project sim-
plifies to
Un  max
αA ½0;1
fbp  u½αθþð1αÞb1þð1bpÞ  u½αθþΩ2c1g: ð22Þ
The agent's participation constraint at t¼1 can be
written as
Unðαn; bp; b1ÞZΩ1þΩ2; ð23Þ
and his incentive compatibility constraint as
Unðαn; bp; b1ÞZu½s1þΩ2: ð24Þ
Under the assumption that u½sn1 ¼ 0rΩ1, the incentive
compatibility constraint is always satisfied as long as the
agent's participation constraint holds. Furthermore, the
agent's participation constraint must be binding at the
optimum because the principal has all the bargaining
power. Thus, we obtain30
Unðαn; bp; bn1Þ ¼Ω1þΩ2: ð25Þ
This in turn implies that for sn2 and b
n
2, we have
sn2 ¼ u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1bpc2Δn oαn pþδΔð Þbn1 ð26Þ
and
bn2 ¼ u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1þ 1bp c2Δn o
u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1bpc2Δn o 1αn bn1 ð27Þ
in case the project can be improved at t¼2. Otherwise, we
have sn2 ¼ bn2 ¼ 0.
Regarding the optimal incentive claim granted to the
agent at the beginning of the first period, the principal
chooses bn1 so that
Unðαn; bp; bn1Þ ¼Ω1þΩ2: ð28Þ
Thus, bn1 is determined by simultaneously satisfyingbp  u½αnðpþδΔÞb1þð1αnÞb1
þð1bpÞ  u½αnðpþδΔÞb1Ω1c1 ¼ 0 ð29Þ
and
αnAarg max
αA ½0;1
bp  u½αθþð1αÞbn1þð1bpÞ  u½αθþΩ2c1 :
ð30Þ
A.2.5. Optimal contract
Proposition 1. Optimal contract. The optimal contract in case
the project can be improved at t¼2 is
sn1 ¼ 0 ð31Þ
bn1A
b1: bp  u½αnðpþδΔÞb1þð1αnÞb1
þð1bpÞ  u½αnðpþδΔÞb1Ω1c1 ¼ 0
( )
ð32Þ
sn2 ¼ u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1bpc2Δn oαn pþδΔð Þbn1 ð33Þ
bn2 ¼ u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1þ 1bp c2Δn o
u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1bpc2Δn o 1αn bn1 ð34Þ
with αn ¼ 1 for bprpþδΔ and
αnAarg max
αA ½0;1
bp  u½αðpþδΔÞbn1þð1αÞbn1
þð1bpÞ  u½αðpþδΔÞbn1þΩ2c1
( )
ð35Þ
for bp4pþδΔ. In case the project cannot be improved at t¼2,
sn1 and b
n
1 are unchanged, and s
n
2 ¼ bn2 ¼ 0.
A.3. Comparative statics
A.3.1. Comparative statics for bn1 and α
n
For bprpþδΔ, we have αn ¼ 1 and
bn1 ¼
u1fΩ1þc1g
pþδΔ : ð36Þ
Thus, we obtain
dbn1
dbp ¼ dαndbp ¼ 0: ð37Þ
29 Note that sn1 ¼ 0 implies αnA ð0;1Þ for bp4pþδΔ because
limw-0u0ðwÞ ¼1. That is, the agent never keeps all of his incentive claim
ðαn ¼ 0Þ and always sells some of it to the outside investor.
30 Note that the agent foresees what price the outside investors will
be willing to pay for his original incentive claim as well as his optimal
response αn .
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For bp4pþδΔ, we have αnA ð0;1Þ, and bn1 is determined
by simultaneously satisfying the two equations
F αn; bn1; bp ¼ u0½αnθu0½αnθþð1αnÞbn1
bp  ð1pδΔÞ
ð1bpÞ  ðpþδΔÞ ¼ 0
ð38Þ
and
Gðαn; bn1; bpÞ ¼ bp  u½αnθþð1αnÞbn1þð1bpÞ  u½αnθ
Ω1c1 ¼ 0: ð39Þ
In that case, using the total derivatives of Fðαn; bn1; bpÞ and
Gðαn; bn1; bpÞ, we can derive the following two expressions:
dbn1
dbp ¼
∂G
∂αn
 ∂F
∂bp ∂G∂bp  ∂F∂αn
∂G
∂bn1
 ∂F
∂αn
 ∂G
∂αn
 ∂F
∂bn1
ð40Þ
and
dαn
dbp ¼
∂G
∂bn1
 ∂F
∂bp ∂G∂bp  ∂F∂bn1
∂G
∂αn
 ∂F
∂bn1
 ∂G
∂bn1
 ∂F
∂αn
: ð41Þ
Taking partial derivatives of F and G with respect to αn, bn1,
and bp, we obtain after some simplifying algebra
dbn1
dbp ¼ u½αnθþð1αnÞb
n
1u½αnθbp  u0½αnθþð1αnÞbn1 o0 ð42Þ
and
dαn
dbp ¼ αn½1αnð1pδΔÞbpð1bpÞγ o0: ð43Þ
A.3.2. Comparative statics for sn2 and b
n
2
Taking derivatives of sn2 and b
n
2 with respect to bp, we
obtain for bprpþδΔ
dsn2
dbp ¼ 
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2c1bpc2Δn oh io0 ð44Þ
and
dbn2
dbp ¼ 
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1þ 1bp c2Δn oh i
þ
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1bpc2Δn oh io0: ð45Þ
For bp4pþδΔ, we have
dsn2
dbp ¼ 
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1bpc2Δn oh i|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
ð Þ
 pþδΔð Þαndb
n
1
dbp|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
ðþ Þ
 pþδΔð Þda
n
dbp bn1|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
ðþ Þ
ð46Þ
and
dbn2
dbp ¼ 
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1þ 1bp c2Δn oh iþ
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1bpc2Δn oh i|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
ð Þ
 1αn dbn1
dbp|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
ðþ Þ
þda
n
dbp bn1|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
ð Þ
: ð47Þ
A.3.3. Empirical predictions
In order to derive testable implications, I focus on the
average effect of an agent's optimism regarding his com-
pensation. Specifically, I define the probability weighted
average effect of an agent's optimism on his incentive
compensation as
Υ  1
1þδ 
dbn1
dbp þ δ1þδ  db
n
2
dbp ; ð48Þ
and the probability weighted average effect on his total
compensation as
Ψ  1
1þδ 
dbn1
dbp þds
n
1
dbp
	 

þ δ
1þδ 
dbn2
dbp þds
n
2
dbp
	 

: ð49Þ
For bprpþδΔ, we obtain
Υ ¼ δ
1þδ 
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1þ 1bp c2Δ  
0B@
þ
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1bpc2Δn oh i
1CA
o0 ð50Þ
and
Ψ ¼ δ
1þδ 
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1þ 1bp c2Δn oh i
0B@
1CA
o0: ð51Þ
For bp4pþδΔ, we have
Υ ¼ δ
1þδ 
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1þ 1bp c2Δn oh i
0B@
þ
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1bpc2Δn oh i
1CA
þ δ
1þδ 
dan
dbp bn1þ 11þδ  db
n
1
dbp 1δ 1αn  
o0 ð52Þ
and
Ψ ¼ δ
1þδ 
c2
Δ
u0 u1 Ω1þΩ2þc1þ 1bp c2Δn oh iþ
dan
dbp bn1 1pδΔð Þ
0B@
1CA
þ 1
1þδ 
dbn1
dbp f1δ½1αn 1pδΔð Þg
o0: ð53Þ
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Thus, the average effect of an agent's optimism on his
incentive compensation as well as on his total compensa-
tion is strictly negative.
Appendix B. Effect of optimism on compensation if the
agent's incentive compatibility constraint is not binding
at the optimum
This extension examines the effect of an agent's opti-
mism on his compensation in case the agent's incentive
compatibility constraint is not binding at the optimum. For
ease of exposition, I focus on a one-period version of the
model. An example that demonstrates the effect in the
two-period case is presented at the end, together with an
empirical analysis.
Consider a principal who employs an agent to imple-
ment a one-period project. Implementing the project costs
the agent private effort cost c. The project pays off R with
probability p and zero otherwise. Only the final payoff is
verifiable. The risk-neutral principal has all the bargaining
power. The risk-averse agent has utility function uðÞ,
outside option Ω, and believes the probability of success
to be bp. As before, I assume that uðÞ satisfies u0ðwÞ40,
limw-0u0ðwÞ ¼1, u″ðwÞo0, and u″ðwÞ=u0ðwÞ ¼ γ=w40.
To induce the agent to implement the project, the
principal promises to the agent a fixed payment s and a
variable payment b that is contingent on the project's
success. The agent's incentive compatibility constraint can
be written as
u sþbð Þu sð ÞZ cbp; ð54Þ
and the agent's participation constraint as
uðsÞþbp  ½uðsþbÞuðsÞcZΩ: ð55Þ
The principal's objective function is
max
s;b
pRspb ð56Þ
subject to the agent's incentive compatibility and partici-
pation constraints.
The Lagrangian to the principal's problem is
L¼ p  Rsp  b
þμ  u sþbð Þu sð Þ cbp
 
þλ  fuðsÞþbp  ½uðsþbÞuðsÞcΩg: ð57Þ
The first-order conditions are
∂L
∂s
¼ 1þμn  fu0 snþbn u0 sn g
þλn  fu0ðsnÞþbp  ½u0ðsnþbnÞu0ðsnÞg ¼ 0; ð58Þ
∂L
∂b
¼ pþμn  u0 snþbn þλn  bp  u0 snþbn ¼ 0; ð59Þ
and
μn  u snþbn u sn  cbp
 
¼ 0; ð60Þ
λn  fuðsnÞþbp  ½uðsnþbnÞuðsnÞcΩg ¼ 0; ð61Þ
u sþbð Þu sð ÞZ cbp; ð62Þ
uðsÞþbp  ½uðsþbÞuðsÞcZΩ; ð63Þ
μnZ0; ð64Þ
λnZ0: ð65Þ
From these, we obtain
λn ¼ 1p
u0ðsnÞþ
p
u0ðsnþbnÞ40 ð66Þ
and
μn ¼ pð1bpÞ
u0ðsnþbnÞ
ð1pÞbp
u0ðsnÞ : ð67Þ
Thus, the agent's participation constraint is always binding
at the optimum. The agent's incentive compatibility con-
straint is binding as long as
pð1bpÞ
u0ðsnþbnÞ
ð1pÞbp
u0ðsnÞ 403
u0ðsnþbnÞ
u0ðsnÞ o
pð1bpÞbpð1pÞ: ð68Þ
This is the equivalent to Assumption 1 in the two-period
version of the model. If this condition is satisfied, we
obtain sn ¼ u1fΩg and bn ¼ u1fΩþc=bpgu1fΩg.
If instead we have
u0ðsnþbnÞ
u0ðsnÞ ¼
pð1bpÞbpð1pÞ; ð69Þ
then the agent's incentive compatibility constraint is not
binding at the optimum. In that case, the optimal com-
pensation claims sn and bn are determined by simulta-
neously satisfying
F  uðsnÞþbp  ½uðsnþbnÞuðsnÞc¼Ω ð70Þ
and
G u
0ðsnþbnÞ
u0ðsnÞ 
pð1bpÞbpð1pÞ ¼ 0: ð71Þ
Taking partial derivatives, we obtain
∂F
∂bp ¼ u snþbn u sn 40 ð72Þ
∂F
∂bn
¼ bp  u0 snþbn 40 ð73Þ
∂F
∂sn
¼ u0 sn   1bp þu0 snþbn   bp40 ð74Þ
∂G
∂bp ¼ pbp2ð1pÞ40 ð75Þ
∂G
∂bn
¼ u″ðs
nþbnÞ
u0ðsnÞ o0 ð76Þ
∂G
∂sn
¼ u
0ðsnÞu″ðsnþbnÞu″ðsnÞ  u0ðsnþbnÞ
u0ðsnÞ2
40; ð77Þ
where the last inequality is implied by bn40 and
u″ðwÞ=u0ðwÞ ¼ γ=w40.
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Using
dF ¼ ∂F
∂sn
dsnþ ∂F
∂bn
dbnþ∂F
∂bp dbp ¼ 0 ð78Þ
and
dG¼ ∂G
∂sn
dsnþ ∂G
∂bn
dbnþ∂G
∂bp dbp ¼ 0; ð79Þ
we derive
dsn
dbp ¼
∂G
∂bn
ð Þ
 ∂F
∂bp
ðþ Þ
∂G
∂bp
ðþ Þ
 ∂F
∂bn
ðþ Þ
∂G
∂sn
ðþ Þ
 ∂F
∂bn
ðþ Þ
 ∂G
∂bn
ð Þ
 ∂F
∂sn
ðþ Þ
o0: ð80Þ
Thus, the optimal salary is decreasing in the agent's
optimism if the agent's incentive compatibility constraint
is not binding at the optimum.
The optimal amount of incentive pay in that case,
however, is not in general monotone in the agent's
optimism. We have
dbn
dbp ¼
∂G
∂sn
ðþ Þ
 ∂F
∂bp
ðþ Þ
∂G
∂bp
ðþ Þ
 ∂F
∂sn
ðþ Þ
∂G
∂bn
ð Þ
 ∂F
∂sn
ðþ Þ
 ∂G
∂sn
ðþ Þ
 ∂F
∂bn
ðþ Þ
o0; ð81Þ
if and only if
∂G
∂sn
 ∂F
∂bp4∂G∂bp  ∂F∂sn: ð82Þ
This condition, however, is neither always satisfied nor
always violated.
B.1. The two-period case: an example
The finding that the agent's incentive pay is not
necessarily monotone in his optimism in case the incen-
tive compatibility constraint is not binding extends to the
two-period version of the model as the following example
demonstrates. Assume that we have uðwÞ ¼ lnðwÞ with
u0ðwÞ ¼ 1=w and u″ðwÞ ¼ 1=w2. In that case, using
u0½αnθ
u0½αnθþð1αnÞb1
¼ bp  ð1pδΔÞð1bpÞ  ðpþδΔÞ ð83Þ
we obtain
αn ¼
1 for bprpþδΔ
1bp
1pδΔ for bp4pþδΔ
8><>: ð84Þ
and using
bpu½αnðpþδΔÞbn1þð1αnÞbn1þð1bpÞu½αnðpþδΔÞbn1Ω1c1 ¼ 0 ð85Þ
we obtain
bn1 ¼
expfΩ1þc1g
pþδΔ for bprpþδΔ
exp Ω1þc1bp ln bp  1bp ln 1bp  pþδΔ1pδΔ
  
for bp4pþδΔ:
8>><>>:
ð86Þ
As before, we have sn1 ¼ 0, ∂αn=∂bpr0, and ∂bn1=∂bpr0.
In case the project can be improved in the second
period and assuming that Assumption 1 is violated, sn2 and
bn2 are determined by simultaneously satisfying
u0½αnθþsn2þð1αnÞbn1þbn2
u0½αnθþsn2
¼ ðpþΔÞð1bpΔÞðbpþΔÞð1pΔÞ ð87Þ
and
ðbpþΔÞ  u½αnθþsn2þð1αnÞbn1þbn2þð1bpΔÞ  u½αnθþsn2
c1c2 ¼Ω1þΩ2: ð88Þ
Solving for sn2 and b
n
2, we obtain
sn2 ¼ exp Ω1þΩ2þc1þc2f
 bpþΔ   ln ðbpþΔÞð1pΔÞðpþΔÞð1bpΔÞ
 
αn pþδΔð Þbn1 ð89Þ
and
bn2 ¼ sn2
ðbpþΔÞð1pΔÞ
ðpþΔÞð1bpΔÞ1
 
bn1 1αn 1þ pþδΔð Þ
ðbpþΔÞð1pΔÞ
ðpþΔÞð1bpΔÞ1
	 
  
:
ð90Þ
If the project cannot be improved at t¼2, we have
sn2 ¼ bn2 ¼ 0.31
Fig. 3 shows how sn2 and b
n
2 vary with bp for the special
case of Ω1 ¼ 1, Ω2 ¼ 4, c1 ¼ 1, c2 ¼ 0:2, p¼0.1, δ¼ 0:5, and
Δ¼ 0:2. The horizontal axis shows bp, the vertical axis sn2
and bn2. The figure reveals that if the incentive compat-
ibility constraint is not binding, bn2 is not, in general, a
monotone function of bp.
B.2. Empirical evidence for a non-monotonic effect of CEO
optimism
As the previous example shows, the effect of optimism on
compensation is not, in general, monotone if the agent's
incentive compatibility constraint is not binding. In what
follows, I thus investigate whether or not there is any
evidence in the data for a non-monotonic relation between
a CEO's optimism and his compensation. In particular,
I examine whether or not there is evidence for a locally
positive effect of optimism over a particular range of the
measures LongHolder and HighForecast. That is, I investigate if
for any level of optimism there is any evidence that slightly
more optimistic CEOs receive higher compensation than
slightly less optimistic CEOs. Overall, I do not find convincing
evidence that this is the case.
For the purpose of this analysis, I begin by constructing
dummy variables that indicate different levels of optimism.
The first dummy variable takes the value one if the value of
the optimism measure under consideration, LongHolder or
HighForecast, is between 0.0 and 0.1. The second dummy
takes the value one if the value of the optimism measure is
between 0.1 and 0.2, and so on. The eleventh dummy takes
the value one if the value of the optimism measure is equal
to 1.0.
31 If the project can be improved and Assumption 1 holds, we have
sn2 ¼ expfΩ1þΩ2þc1bpc2=ΔgαnðpþδΔÞbn1 and bn2 ¼ expfΩ1þΩ2þc1
þð1bpÞc2=Δg expfΩ1þΩ2þc1bpc2=Δgð1 αnÞbn1.
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In the second step, I re-estimate the compensation
regressions presented in Section 3, replacing LongHolder
and HighForecast with the corresponding dummy vari-
ables. These specifications estimate the effect of optimism
on compensation for each of the 11 possible levels of
optimism relative to the base level of no optimism (Long-
Holder¼0 or HighForecast¼0) without imposing the
restriction that the effect be monotone.32
Table B1 presents the results of these regressions.
Panel A shows the results for dummies based on Long-
Holder, and Panel C shows the results for dummies based
on HighForecast. Both panels display negative and signifi-
cant coefficient estimates on the optimism dummies, and
in particular, for dummies indicating high levels of opti-
mism. This confirms the results presented throughout
the paper. Optimistic CEOs tend to receive fewer incentives
and lower total compensation than their non-optimistic
peers.
A notable exception are the positive and significant
coefficient estimates on three dummies in the regression
regarding the CEO's restricted stock grants reported in Panel
A. These dummies, Dð0:1oLHr0:2Þ, Dð0:7oLHr0:8Þ, and
DðLH¼ 1:0Þ, indicate CEO-firm combinations for which the
variable LongHolder takes on values between 0.1 and 0.2,
between 0.7 and 0.8, or is equal to one. These estimates thus
present some evidence that some optimistic CEOs may
actually receive larger restricted stock grants than their
unbiased peers, i.e., CEOs for whom the variable LongHolder
is equal to zero. This finding, however, must be interpreted
with caution. It stands in contrast to the insignificant coeffi-
cient estimates on the optimism measures in all regressions
pertaining to restricted stock grants in all other analyses
throughout the paper. Furthermore, the corresponding regres-
sion in Panel C reveals a negative and significant coefficient
estimate on the dummy that indicates a level of HighForecast
between 0.9 and 1.0. The coefficient estimates on all other
dummies in this regression are not significant. Thus, the
overall evidence for a positive effect of optimism on the
amount of restricted stock grants that a CEO receives is weak.
The third step of the analysis is to examine whether or
not the coefficient estimates provide any evidence for a
locally non-monotonic effect of optimism on the different
compensation variables. To do so, I conduct Wald tests of
the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates on two
dummies that indicate adjacent levels of optimism are
equal to each other. In other words, I test whether or not
the effect of optimism on compensation—relative to the
base level of no optimism—is the same for similar levels of
optimism.
Panel B shows the p-values of these tests for the
dummies based on the optimism measure LongHolder.
Panel D presents the p-values of the tests for the dummies
Fig. 3. Example of incentive pay and salary in period 2 if Assumption 1 is violated. This figure shows how sn2 and b
n
2 vary with bp for the special case of
u wð Þ ¼ lnðwÞ, Ω1 ¼ 1, Ω2 ¼ 4, c1 ¼ 1, c2 ¼ 0:2, p¼0.1, δ¼ 0:5, and Δ¼ 0:2. The horizontal axis shows bp , the vertical axis sn2 and bn2.
32 An alternative approach when searching for a non-monotonic
effect of optimism would be to add higher-order terms of the optimism
measures to the regressions, e.g., to regress compensation on LongHolder,
LongHolder2, and LongHolder3. The problem with this approach is that
the optimism measures and their higher-order terms are very highly
correlated with each other: The R2 in a regression of LongHolder on
LongHolder2 is 0.955, and the R2 in a regression of HighForecast on
HighForecast2 is 0.933. This multicollinearity problem makes this alter-
native approach unappealing in my setting.
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Table B1
Regressions with dummies for different levels of optimism.
This table presents regression results using indicator variables for different levels of CEO optimism denoted Dð…Þ in Panels A and C. All other variables are defined as in Tables 4 and 13. The sample period is 1996
to 2005. Heterogeneity-robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by nnn, nn, and n, respectively. Panels B and D
present p-values from Wald tests for equality of the coefficient estimates on the dummies reported in Panels A and C.
Panel A
Ln(Opt.þ1) Ln(Rst.st.þ1) Ln(Bon.þ1) Ln(Sal.þ1) Ln(Totalþ1) Inc./Total
Dð0:0oLHr0:1Þ 0.316 0.466 0.171 0.058 0.064 0.013
(0.281) (0.855) (0.384) (0.069) (0.111) (0.027)
Dð0:1oLHr0:2Þ 0.564 1.230nn 0.048 0.170 0.120 0.041
(0.713) (0.527) (0.563) (0.152) (0.114) (0.040)
Dð0:2oLHr0:3Þ 0.856 0.021 0.536 0.131 0.084 0.038
(0.589) (0.886) (0.866) (0.160) (0.237) (0.061)
Dð0:3oLHr0:4Þ 0.500 0.134 0.545 0.091 0.119 0.008
(0.660) (1.092) (0.790) (0.083) (0.175) (0.057)
Dð0:4oLHr0:5Þ 0.335 0.693 0.016 0.113 0.304 nnn 0.045
(0.408) (0.577) (0.552) (0.121) (0.101) (0.030)
Dð0:5oLHr0:6Þ 0.417 0.416 0.643 0.778 0.136 0.064
(0.469) (0.624) (0.515) (0.544) (0.251) (0.051)
Dð0:6oLHr0:7Þ 0.973nnn 0.290 0.462 0.006 0.244nn 0.055n
(0.331) (0.715) (0.472) (0.099) (0.118) (0.029)
Dð0:7oLHr0:8Þ 0.034 1.024nn 1.388nnn 0.115 0.140 0.014
(0.634) (0.484) (0.256) (0.108) (0.136) (0.061)
Dð0:8oLHr0:9Þ 1.101 0.394 1.281 0.642 0.305 0.064
(0.707) (1.227) (0.928) (0.516) (0.215) (0.065)
Dð0:9oLHo1:0Þ 1.848nn 0.772 0.039 0.758 0.229 0.071
(0.878) (1.345) (0.302) (0.620) (0.229) (0.093)
DðLH¼ 1:0Þ 0.584 1.109nn 0.800nnn 0.041 0.151 0.055n
(0.361) (0.549) (0.280) (0.064) (0.097) (0.030)
Ln(MktCap) 0.643nnn 0.257nnn 0.982nnn 0.074n 0.455nnn 0.071nnn
(0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.044) (0.027) (0.008)
Std.return 0.445 0.402 4.176nnn 0.582 0.284 0.125
(1.139) (1.180) (0.933) (0.441) (0.314) (0.101)
Leverage 0.581 0.317 0.206 0.108 0.029 0.026
(0.505) (0.474) (0.467) (0.083) (0.118) (0.037)
MtB 0.013 0.003 0.071nnn 0.001 0.005 0.000
(0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.011) (0.008) (0.002)
Cash/Assets 0.071 0.495 0.689 0.114 0.297 0.004
(0.748) (0.672) (0.641) (0.175) (0.201) (0.052)
R&D/Assets 0.032 2.614n 3.875nn 0.436 0.196 0.107
(1.218) (1.427) (1.866) (0.333) (0.405) (0.100)
R&D missing 0.335 0.301 0.333 0.163 0.007 0.009
(0.509) (0.375) (0.313) (0.114) (0.093) (0.026)
Boardsize 0.033 0.034 0.064nn 0.013 0.001 0.003
(0.033) (0.039) (0.029) (0.012) (0.007) (0.002)
Independent 0.160 0.837n 0.049 0.225nn 0.076 0.004
(0.434) (0.477) (0.364) (0.112) (0.103) (0.030)
Return 0.096 0.069nn 0.184 0.007 0.047 0.004
(0.069) (0.029) (0.138) (0.008) (0.029) (0.003)
EBIT/Assets 0.099 0.755 7.180nnn 0.323n 0.422n 0.193nnn
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(0.822) (0.629) (0.845) (0.195) (0.251) (0.071)
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.483 0.584 0.534 0.678 0.767 0.578
N 5,777 5,777 5,777 5,777 5,777 5,777
Panel B
Null hypothesis Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1) Incentives/Total
Dð0:0oLHr0:1Þ ¼Dð0:1oLHr0:2Þ 0.736 0.080n 0.732 0.164 0.215 0.538
Dð0:1oLHr0:2Þ ¼Dð0:2oLHr0:3Þ 0.745 0.225 0.631 0.194 0.425 0.259
Dð0:2oLHr0:3Þ ¼Dð0:3oLHr0:4Þ 0.613 0.919 0.995 0.129 0.386 0.686
Dð0:3oLHr0:4Þ ¼Dð0:4oLHr0:5Þ 0.829 0.500 0.584 0.875 0.341 0.410
Dð0:4oLHr0:5Þ ¼Dð0:5oLHr0:6Þ 0.891 0.166 0.337 0.097n 0.101 0.051n
Dð0:5oLHr0:6Þ ¼Dð0:6oLHr0:7Þ 0.314 0.436 0.101 0.154 0.165 0.871
Dð0:6oLHr0:7Þ ¼Dð0:7oLHr0:8Þ 0.161 0.105 0.075n 0.409 0.548 0.290
Dð0:7oLHr0:8Þ ¼Dð0:8oLHr0:9Þ 0.239 0.272 0.910 0.290 0.512 0.366
Dð0:8oLHr0:9Þ ¼Dð0:9oLHo1:0Þ 0.514 0.831 0.165 0.885 0.806 0.947
Dð0:9oLHo1:0Þ ¼DðLH ¼ 1:0Þ 0.171 0.181 0.040nn 0.259 0.747 0.861
Panel C
Ln(Opt.þ1) Ln(Rst.st.þ1) Ln(Bon.þ1) Ln(Sal.þ1) Ln(Totalþ1) Inc./Total
Dð0:0oHFr0:1Þ 0.104 0.030 0.184 0.144 0.009 0.041
(0.488) (0.419) (0.322) (0.166) (0.121) (0.030)
Dð0:1oHFr0:2Þ 0.243 0.514 0.057 0.080 0.088 0.027
(0.304) (0.334) (0.283) (0.102) (0.077) (0.023)
Dð0:2oHFr0:3Þ 0.126 0.623 0.035 0.079 0.094 0.010
(0.306) (0.424) (0.330) (0.146) (0.117) (0.026)
Dð0:3oHFr0:4Þ 0.350 0.392 0.383 0.031 0.001 0.035
(0.301) (0.379) (0.260) (0.102) (0.071) (0.023)
Dð0:4oHFr0:5Þ 0.104 0.144 0.356 0.050 0.037 0.032
(0.247) (0.273) (0.257) (0.159) (0.059) (0.020)
Dð0:5oHFr0:6Þ 0.528 0.441 0.561 0.379 0.015 0.007
(0.454) (0.689) (0.396) (0.351) (0.145) (0.042)
Dð0:6oHFr0:7Þ 0.173 0.458 0.398 0.153 0.073 0.011
(0.336) (0.430) (0.340) (0.157) (0.106) (0.024)
Dð0:7oHFr0:8Þ 0.374 0.118 0.806n 0.172 0.005 0.011
(0.369) (0.546) (0.433) (0.180) (0.121) (0.031)
Dð0:8oHFr0:9Þ 0.397 0.582 0.671n 0.010 0.269nn 0.072nnn
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Table B1 (continued )
Panel C
Ln(Opt.þ1) Ln(Rst.st.þ1) Ln(Bon.þ1) Ln(Sal.þ1) Ln(Totalþ1) Inc./Total
(0.348) (0.581) (0.368) (0.145) (0.132) (0.026)
Dð0:9oHFo1:0Þ 1.270nn 1.052nn 0.185 0.008 0.307nn 0.070
(0.531) (0.433) (0.479) (0.091) (0.124) (0.048)
DðHF ¼ 1:0Þ 0.523n 0.210 0.579nn 0.027 0.140n 0.040nn
(0.272) (0.341) (0.248) (0.086) (0.076) (0.019)
ForecastLead 0.002n 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000n
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
ForecastWidth 0.310 0.038 1.004 0.125 0.066 0.071
(1.385) (2.055) (1.506) (0.934) (0.498) (0.115)
ForecastWidth2 0.487 0.819 1.050 0.115 0.228 0.051
(1.514) (2.166) (1.668) (0.939) (0.555) (0.118)
Ln(MktCap) 0.687nnn 0.119 0.867nnn 0.095nnn 0.425nnn 0.073nnn
(0.085) (0.085) (0.091) (0.030) (0.025) (0.006)
Std.return 1.513 1.634 2.945nn 0.619 0.119 0.116
(1.385) (1.291) (1.256) (0.417) (0.350) (0.094)
Leverage 0.611 0.971nn 0.205 0.062 0.001 0.007
(0.422) (0.419) (0.402) (0.108) (0.103) (0.032)
MtB 0.002 0.009 0.065nnn 0.008 0.001 0.001
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.006) (0.010) (0.001)
Cash/Assets 0.584 0.265 1.475nnn 0.171 0.257 0.091n
(0.669) (0.599) (0.549) (0.120) (0.182) (0.048)
R&D/Assets 0.247 2.643n 3.249nn 0.634 0.389 0.014
(1.455) (1.481) (1.520) (0.441) (0.536) (0.125)
R&D missing 0.039 0.569 0.123 0.079 0.117 0.032
(0.349) (0.362) (0.262) (0.069) (0.073) (0.022)
Boardsize 0.017 0.023 0.062nn 0.026nn 0.009 0.004nn
(0.027) (0.034) (0.028) (0.013) (0.007) (0.002)
Independent 0.131 0.309 0.113 0.221nn 0.078 0.019
0.378 0.404 0.300 0.106 0.093 0.026
Return 0.113n 0.123nnn 0.296 0.009 0.048 0.001
0.068 0.028 0.186 0.008 0.026 0.002
EBIT/Assets 0.362 0.423 8.524nnn 0.019 0.602 0.273nnn
0.680 0.584 0.768 0.169 0.240 0.059
Firm, year,
tenure, age,
and gender
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.447 0.534 0.519 0.734 0.724 0.545
N 8,238 8,238 8,238 8,238 8,238 8,238
Panel D
Null hypothesis Ln(Optionsþ1) Ln(Rst.stockþ1) Ln(Bonusþ1) Ln(Salaryþ1) Ln(Totalþ1) Incentives/Total
Dð0oHFr0:1Þ ¼Dð0:1oHFr0:2Þ 0.487 0.301 0.539 0.165 0.555 0.685
Dð0:1oHFr0:2Þ ¼Dð0:2oHFr0:3Þ 0.743 0.814 0.813 0.188 0.960 0.570
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based on HighForecast. As can be seen from Panel B, the
null hypothesis that the effect of optimism on compensa-
tion is the same for two adjacent levels of optimism can
typically not be rejected. There are four exceptions. The null of
Dð0:0oLHr0:1Þ ¼Dð0:1oLHr0:2Þ is rejected at the 10%
level in the regression pertaining to restricted stock grants.
The hypotheses of Dð0:6oLHr0:7Þ ¼Dð0:7oLHr0:8Þ and
Dð0:9oLHo1:0Þ ¼DðLH¼ 1:0Þ are rejected at the 10% level
and the 5% level for the CEO's bonus payments. The null of
Dð0:4oLHr0:5Þ ¼Dð0:5oLHr0:6Þ is rejected at the 10%
level regarding the CEO's salary. And, finally, the null of
Dð0:4oLHr0:5Þ ¼Dð0:5oLHr0:6Þ is rejected at the 10%
level in the regression for the fraction of incentives in the
CEO's total compensation.
However, with respect to the regressions pertaining to
the CEO's restricted stock grants, the null hypotheses
Dð0:7oLHr0:8Þ ¼Dð0:8oLHr0:9Þ and Dð0:9oLHo
1:0Þ ¼DðLH¼ 1:0Þ cannot be rejected. In other words, even
though Panel A provided some evidence that some opti-
mistic CEOs may actually receive larger restricted stock
grants than their unbiased peers, the hypothesis that very
optimistic CEOs receive the same amount of restricted
stock grants as slightly less optimistic CEOs cannot be
rejected.
Similar to Panel B, Panel D reveals little evidence against
the null hypothesis of equal coefficients on the optimism
dummies based on the variable HighForecast. There are two
exceptions. The null hypothesis of Dð0:9oHFo1:0Þ ¼
DðHF ¼ 1:0Þ is rejected at the 10% level in the regression
pertaining to restricted stock grants. Thus, the coefficient on
Dð0:9oHFo1:0Þ, 1.052, in the restricted stock grants
regression presented in Panel C is significantly different from
the coefficient on DðHF ¼ 1:0Þ, 0.210. This finding can be
interpreted as evidence that the effect of optimism on the
amount of restricted stock grants may indeed be locally
positive for very high levels of optimism. The second excep-
tion is the null of Dð0:7oHFr0:8Þ ¼Dð0:8o HFr0:9Þ,
which is rejected at the 5% level in the regression pertaining
to the fraction of incentives in the CEO's total compensation.
This, however, is evidence of a locally negative effect of
optimism. In summary, Table B1 thus provides only very little
evidence for a non-monotonic effect of optimism on
compensation.
Appendix C. Description of cleanse indicators in the
insider ﬁlings data
Asmentioned in Section 2, the insider filings data obtained
from Thomson Reuters contain cleanse indicators that indi-
cate the overall level of confidence in each record. The
following information regarding these indicators is taken
from the data description file that is provided by Thomson
Reuters together with the data. Thomson's proprietary data
cleansing process verifies the accuracy and reasonableness of
insider-reported figures by reference to external sources. Data
(e.g., transaction prices, acquisition/disposition indicators, etc.)
that appear erroneous or unreasonable are corrected by
substituting information from alternative sources. The cleanse
indicator indicates Thomson's level of confidence concerning
the accuracy of a particular record contained in the database.
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There are nine cleanse indicators:
 R: Data verified through the cleansing process.
 H: Cleansed with a very high level of confidence.
 L: One or more data cleansing actions were undertaken,
but secondary sources were unavailable for complete
verification.
 I: Some data elements were improved (inserted or
replaced) in order to make the data usable. In some
cases, records with a cleanse indicator of “I” may
contain data that could not be verified or were deter-
mined to be outside a reasonable range.
 C: A record added to a nonderivative table or a
derivative table in order to correspond with a record
on the opposing table.
 W: Indicates an improperly reported holding record on
the derivative table. This occurs when the insider
reports a holdings value in the number of derivatives
or number of underlying shares field (and no value was
reported for resulting derivatives held).
 Y: An as-reported holding value identified by data
cleansing.
 S: No cleansing attempted; security does not meet our
collection requirements.
 A: Numerous data elements were missing or invalid;
reasonable assumptions could not be made.
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